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ABSTRACT
REACTIONS TO INGROUP CRITICS UNDER THREAT: SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS THAT MAGNIFY VERSUS MITIGATE NEGATIVE
REACTIONS
SEPTEMBER 2017
LEVI Y. ADELMAN, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Nilanjana Dasgupta
Openness to criticism directed at one’s group can improve the quality of group decisions
and alert groups to impending bad decisions. Past research has found that people respond
more positively to criticism of their group when it comes from an ingroup versus
outgroup member. Four experiments were conducted to examine whether people were
less open to criticism of their group from fellow ingroup critics when they felt that their
group’s wellbeing was threatened. The results suggest that this preference for criticism
from ingroup members is significantly reduced or erased when criticism comes in a
context of high threat, which decreases trust, willingness to share the criticism with
others, the persuasiveness of ingroup (relative to outgroup) critics’ communication, while
also increasing anger. The underlying psychological process behind these negative
responses is attributional—greater suspicion of ingroup critics’ motives, which eliminates
ingroup critics’ advantage relative to critics from the outside. In Experiment 4, affirming
the importance of dissent and free speech as a fundamental value of the ingroup emerged
as an effective remedy to increase openness to criticism despite high threat.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A few years ago a well-known and highly regarded British Muslim journalist,
Mehdi Hasan, published an article in The New Statesman criticizing Muslim communities
for being too willing to believe conspiracy theories targeting their group (Hasan, 2014).
Despite the high regard he commanded in the British Muslim community, his opinion
prompted a sharp backlash from his fans and followers, many of whom called him a
media shill, and accused him of taking “Zionist coin.”
The type of backlash that Mehdi Hasan’s article received was both surprising and
unsurprising. On the one hand, consistent with social identity theory, people who strongly
identify with their group are motivated to endorse positive attributions about their group
and reject negative ones (Brown, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), making it unsurprising
that Hasan’s fans would reject criticism directed at their group. On the other hand,
decades of persuasion research shows that the status and credibility of communicators
bolsters the persuasive power of their communication (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; see
Pornpitakpan, 2004 for a review). This line of research would suggest that Hasan’s fans
ought to have been open to his opinions and inclined to be persuaded given his credibility
within their community. However, for some of them, this did not appear to be the case.
I argue that Hasan’s case is part of a larger phenomenon wherein dissent or
criticism of one’s group from a fellow ingroup member may elicit two very different
reactions. The social psychological conditions that push perceivers to be more open or
more closed to critical opinions about their group are not well understood. Furthermore,
past research has not yet determined the psychological processes driving such positive
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and negative reactions to group criticism. The present research seeks to shed light on
these important issues that are both theoretically and practically important.
Internal criticism or dissent within groups is vital for social groups’ success: they
prevent group members from insulating themselves against alternative viewpoints that
could prove to be vital to group decision-making (Postmes, Spears, and Cihangir, 2001),
regardless of whether or not the alternative viewpoints contain truth or not (Mill,
1859/1972; Solomon, 2006). They can also prevent groupthink, the process by which
members of a group overemphasize similar opinions in decision-making and shut down
dissenters who favor alternative decisions, which has led to several disastrous decisions
by groups in recent history, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion and strategic decisions
related to the Vietnam War (Baron, 2005; Janis, 1982; see also Noelle-Neumann, 1974).
Dissenting and critical opinions are known to improve decision-making by increasing
creativity and innovation within groups (De Dreu and West, 2001) and generate more and
better solutions to problems (Nemeth, Brown, and Rogers, 2001; see Jetten and Hornsey,
2014 for a review).
This is particularly important in large groups such as nation states, where critical
dissent within groups is vital for democracy to flourish. Many political philosophers have
identified criticism and dissent as being central to how democracy and public discussions
develop and elaborate (e.g., Dewey, 1927; Habermas, 1991; 2006; Mouffe, 2000).
Mouffe (2000) argues that liberal democracies contain an inherent tension between two
competing values: the individual freedoms of liberalism and the democratic systems by
which the majority governs over all. She proposes that a healthy relationship between
these two values can be maintained through agonistic democracy, where people value and
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welcome dissent and critical opinions as an essential part of the process of maintaining a
healthy society. The conversations between often disagreeing and dissenting members of
public are what grants power to the people of society to generate change as positive
outcomes (Arendt, 2013; see also Schudson, 1997). Furthermore, collective action is
predicated upon speech, which is derived from conversations between people and
attempts to persuade one another (Arendt, 2013). However, these ongoing conversations
and agonistic dialogues happen between members of different groups and members of the
same larger groups that share both similarities and differences (Arendt, 2013) with the
accompanying tensions between assimilation with others and differentiation from others
(Brewer, 1991). These tensions run the risk of silencing the dissenting conversations that
are so important to the success of social groups and societies. Noelle-Neumann and
Petersen (2004) argue that people’s social inclinations and fear of isolation can lead to
“spirals of silence” where people are too afraid of the consequences to share their
political views (see also Noelle-Neumann, 1974). In addition, American1 society’s
openness to criticism and dissenting opinions specifically is also threatened by an
unwillingness to talk about politics openly (Eliasoph, 1998), a motivation to avoid the
opinions of others (Frimer, Skitka, & Motyl, 2017), and even simply an unwillingness to
disagree with others (Carbaugh, 1988; see also Pomerantz, 1984).
Therefore, given the social importance of being open to criticism and dissent, and
the threats facing that openness, it is important to understand when and why people
become less open to these essential elements of social and political conversation. It is

For the sake of brevity, I will be using the terms “America” and “American” to refer to the United States
of America and citizens of the United States of America respectively. While I acknowledge that some
people consider such references to be improper and imperialist, it is nonetheless in common usage both
within the U.S. and in many regions of the world.
1
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also important to understand how shared and distinct social identities impact people’s
openness to critical messages.
In light of the importance of criticism to group functioning, this research seeks to
investigate the phenomenon whereby people may become less open to accepting critical
opinions. I synthesize persuasion theories and social identity theory, two literatures that
typically function as separate knowledge domains, to address four research questions at
its intersection. First, I investigate how systematic variations in social context influence
perceivers’ reactions to critical communication—enhancing persuasion under some
conditions but inhibiting persuasion under other conditions. Second, I examine how the
identity of communicators impacts reactions to critical opinions. Third, I test an
underlying process to explain why criticism is sometimes received well and other times
not. Finally, I design and test an intervention to increase openness to group criticism.
What promotes persuasion? Lessons from classic theories of persuasion
There is a rich history of theoretical and empirical research on persuasion in
social psychology from which emerged important factors that are known to influence
persuasion—characteristics of the communicator, characteristics of the communication,
and the audience (e.g. Elder, Sutton, and Douglas, 2005; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984;
Pornpitakpan, 2004). I utilize the first two factors to derive hypotheses about when
critical communications, presented in oral communication or written text, from ingroup
members ought to elicit more or less persuasion.
Communicator characteristics
One of the primary factors or determinants of persuasion is the identity of the
communicator. Among the many characteristics of communicators that influence
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persuasion, one of the most consistent ones is credibility (see Pornpitakpan, 2004 for a
review). Communicator credibility has been operationalized in many ways; most popular
among them has been to manipulate the expertise of the communicator by varying how
knowledgeable he or she is about the topic of the communication (Clark, Wegener,
Habashi, & Evans, 2010; Horai, Naccari, & Fatoullah, 1974; Hovland & Weiss, 1951;
Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Johnson, Torcivia, & Poprick, 1968; Kelman &
Hovland, 1953; Maddux & Rogers, 1980; Sutton, Elder, & Douglas, 2006). This
literature shows, not surprisingly, that people are more persuaded by communication
originating from a topical expert than from a non-expert. Expertise generally accounts for
9-16% of the variance in persuasion, amounting to a medium effect size (Wilson and
Sherrell, 1993).
Importantly, expertise is also a matter of perception—the group membership of
the communicator may affect perceived expertise. As a case in point, the gender of a
communicator may affect perceived expertise. Female communicators who were
objective experts in task groups working on a male-oriented task were subjectively
perceived to have less expertise than equivalent male communicators (Thomas-Hunt &
Phillips, 2004). Expert women also had less influence on fellow group members’
behavior than expert men, and groups with expert women underperformed relative to
respective groups with expert men (Thomas-Hunt & Phillips, 2004).
Another study orthogonally varied the group membership of a critical
communicator (ingroup vs. outgroup) and his or her expertise in the subject of
communication (Hornsey & Imani, 2004). They found that ingroup critics were seen as
having more expertise than outgroup critics simply as a function of their group
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membership, and expert ingroup critics were judged as having more expertise than all
other types of critics (non-expert ingroup critics, expert and non-expert outgroup critics;
see also Sutton, Elder, & Douglas, 2006). Likewise, other studies have found that people
are more influenced by ingroup than outgroup members (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane,
Hogg, & Turner, 1990), and are more willing to learn from ingroup members, especially
ones who have superior knowledge, as compared to outgroup members regardless of their
knowledge (Kane, Argote, & Levine, 2005). Moreover, although people are more
persuaded by strong rather than weak arguments from ingroup members, argument
strength does not change the low persuasiveness of outgroup members (Mackie, Worth,
& Asuncion, 1990). The benefits of ingroup membership also extends to dissenting
numerical minorities, as research shows that ingroup numerical minorities can indirectly
influence attitudes, as they are more positively evaluated and generate less counterargument (Alvaro & Crano, 1997).
Together, these findings show that shared group membership is one of the signals
that amplify the persuasiveness of a communication. These findings fit well with social
identity theory, which proposes ingroup favoritism as a central tenet—that ingroup
members are strongly favored over outgroup members (e.g. Abrams & Hogg, 1988;
Brewer, 1999; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Ingroup favoritism is the likely reason why
ingroup members are seen as persuasive experts more so than outgroup members even
when they convey the same message.
The group membership of communicators also creates expectations about their
intentions (Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1978; Hornsey & Imani, 2004; Sutton, Elder, &
Douglas, 2006; Vivian & Berkowitz, 1992). People infer biases in communicators’
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message based on their group allegiance. One study showed that when a communicator
was described as historically pro-environment and proposed a pro-environment message,
that communicator was perceived as having a “knowledge bias” or not knowing the truth
of the situation, which undermined his persuasiveness influence as compared to the same
message attributed to a communicator who was historically pro-business (Eagly et al.,
1978). Thus, this finding emphasizes the extent to which the recipients of a message take
into account past actions and group loyalty of the communicator to derive that person’s
intentions and biases when communicating. Most relevant to the current research, this
finding suggests that people make inferences about communicators’ intentions based on
their group membership.
Communication characteristics
The persuasiveness of a communication also depends on the content of the
communication itself—characteristics such as argument quality and quantity (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1984), matching message content to the needs of audience (Petty and Briñol,
2008; Petty & Wegener, 1998), message framing (Block & Keller, 1995; Maheswaran &
Meyers-Levy, 1990; Mayer & Tormala, 2010; Smith & Petty, 1996), and message
valence (Chang & Chou, 2008; Geers, Handley, & McLarney, 2003; Jacks & Lancaster,
2015). Most closely related to my research, past research shows that communications that
praise listeners’ ingroup are more persuasive regardless of who the communicator is
(ingroup or outgroup member) as compared to communications that criticize their group,
which are less persuasive especially when the communicator is an outgroup member
(Hornsey, Oppes, & Svensson, 2002). Hornsey and colleagues termed this the intergroup
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sensitivity effect (ISE), an effect that has been replicated many times (see Jetten &
Hornsey, 2014 for a review).
Taken together, persuasion theories as well as social identity theory suggest that
people are significantly more persuaded by critiques of their ingroup when
communicators are ingroup members rather than outgroup members. While it is true that
people are slow to embrace critical communications about their group in general (e.g.
Hornsey, Oppes, & Svensson, 2002), such communications coming from ingroup
members are given more benefit of the doubt than those coming from outgroup members
because of ingroup critics are assumed to have positive intentions toward the group (e.g.
Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken, 1978; Hornsey & Imani, 2004), greater expertise (e.g. Hovland
& Weiss, 1951), and be similar to the audience (e.g. Mackie, Worth, and Asuncion,
1990). While existing theories and data show that ingroup communicators have a
persuasion advantage, they do not address two important questions: Under what
conditions might there be backlash against ingroup critics? And why might that happen?
These questions, not answered by past research, are the focus of my present investigation.
How social context influences reactions to criticism
I propose that the social context in which a critical communication is delivered
serves as an important condition determining whether that criticism will be accepted or
rejected, regardless of its source (i.e. ingroup or outgroup member). Several loosely
related findings point to the hypothesis that social contexts perceived as threatening to
one’s group are likely to reduce people’s tolerance toward critical communications even
when they come from ingroup experts. First, in his classic work on groupthink, Janis
(1972) suggested that when a group faces intense external pressure, there is increased
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tendency for groupthink and conformity within the group. Second, other research
suggests that people respond poorly to critical communications in the presence of
intergroup conflicts as compared to the absence of such conflicts (Benard, 2012;
Hornsey, 2006; Kelman, 1995; Matheson, Cole, and Majka, 2003). Specifically,
intergroup conflict increases enforcement of within-group norms and limits openness to
norm deviation (Benard, 2012). Third, perceived threat to one’s group makes people
more politically intolerant towards members of outgroups (Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen,
2004) and, to a lesser degree, toward critical members of ingroups (Shamir & SagivSchifter, 2006). For example, in the aftermath of a television show critical of past
Croatian political leaders (a threat evoking situation) many Croatian government officials
rejected criticism of the Croatian regime arguing that the international context was too
threatening to allow an internal critique, which was documented in a qualitative study of
public political discourse (Penic, Elcheroth, & Reicher, 2015).
The handful of studies mentioned above suggests how the presence of external
threat affects reactions to ingroup critics only. Only three studies have compared whether
threat differentially changes reactions toward ingroup compared to outgroup critics (see
Ariyanto, Hornsey, & Gallois, 2010; Khoo & See, 2014; See & Petty, 2006). One of
these studies (Ariyanto et al, 2010) shows that in the absence of threat people express
more favorable attitudes toward ingroup than outgroup critics, but when primed with
violent conflict they dislike all critics regardless of group membership. However,
surprisingly, threat had no effect on the persuasive influence of the communication
(Ariyanto et al. 2010). The other two studies (Khoo & See, 2014; See & Petty, 2006) did
not test external threat vs. no threat per se, but rather tested how people responded to
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either pro-attitudinal and counter-attitudinal messages or critical opinions after having
been primed with either personal existential threat in the form of mortality salience
(Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989) or dental pain. See and
Petty (2006) found that when people are primed with personal existential threat, they
evaluate outgroup members more positively when they express a pro-attitudinal message
and less positively when they express a counter-attitudinal message, whereas ingroup
members are evaluated positively regardless of the content of their message. In contrast,
when people are primed with dental pain, they evaluate ingroup members more positively
than outgroup members regardless of the content of their message. Similarly, Khoo and
See (2014) found that people evaluated ingroup critics more negatively after being
primed mortality salience than after being primed with dental pain, whereas they
evaluated the outgroup critic equally regardless of the prime. Importantly, these two
studies (Khoo & See, 2014; See & Petty, 2006) tested the effects of mortality salience
compared to dental pain without a true control condition and also did not measure
persuasion. Thus, these studies are inconclusive as to whether threatening social contexts
affect the persuasiveness of critical communications, and whether the communicator’s
group membership moderates such persuasion.
Thus, one important goal of my research is to investigate this unanswered issue:
will encountering threat significantly reduce the persuasive power of ingroup critics but
have relatively less impact on outgroup critics? I predict that absent threat, people are
more likely to be persuaded by communications, even ones that are critical of their
ingroup, when they come from ingroup rather than outgroup communicators. But in the
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presence of threat, they will become less tolerant of critical opinions, responding
especially harshly to ingroup critics.
Psychological mechanism that drives defensiveness under threat
According to the intergroup sensitivity effect, criticism from ingroup members is
typically attributed to the ingroup critic’s benevolent motives toward their own group
whereas criticism from outgroup members is not, explaining why ingroup critics receive
more positive responses than outgroup critics (Hornsey et al., 2007; Hornsey & Imani,
2004; Hornsey, Oppes, and Svensson, 2002; Hornsey, Trembath, & Gunthorpe, 2004). I
predict that while this may be the case when a critical communication is delivered in the
absence of threat, this dynamic will change when group members feel that their group is
under threat. In the latter case, criticism from ingroup members is likely to be perceived
as an act of betrayal, siding with the enemy, and be attributed to the critic’s malevolent
motives.
A possible remedy: Using value affirmation to promote openness to group criticism
Criticism plays a central role in helping groups broaden their perspective and
make better decisions (e.g., Baron, 2005; De Dreu and West, 2001; Postmes, Spears, and
Cihangir, 2001). This is particularly important when groups feel threatened because these
are circumstances in which group members are prone to making harmful decisions with
potentially devastating consequences (Cadinu and Reggiori, 2002; Shamir & SagivSchifter, 2006; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004; Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios Morrison,
2009). But ironically, this is exactly the situation in which people become less open to
alternative critical communications even from within their group (Ariyanto et al., 2010).
What intervention might mitigate such defensive reactions and increase openness to
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criticism despite threat? Given that the underlying process driving the defensiveness is
predicted to be attributional—attributing malevolent intentions to the critic—I sought to
change people’s attributions by appealing to a fundamental value of their ingroup. In
other words, I propose value affirmation as an intervention.
Past research has found that affirming values is an important way of ensuring that
people act in a value-consistent manner (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, &
Chatel, 1992; Rothschild, Abdollahi, & Pyszczynski, 2009; Verplanken & Holland,
2002). Affirming individual or personal values have been found to reduce intolerance
towards outgroups (Greenberg et al., 1992), and protect against stereotype threat (Derks,
Scheepers, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2010; Kinias & Sim, 2016). Affirming group values
have also been found to reduce support for intergroup aggression and hostility
(Rothschild, Abdollahi, & Pyszczynski, 2009), protect against sexism (Spencer-Rogers,
Major, Forster, & Peng, 2016), increase willingness to accept responsibility for group
losses (Sherman, Kinias, Major, Kim, & Prenovost, 2007), and protect stigmatized group
members’ self-concept after negative performance feedback (Derks, Van Laar, &
Ellemers, 2006; 2009). Together, this work suggests that while situational threat can have
many negative consequences, affirming important values may protect the self and one’s
group against threat (Derks, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2006; 2009; Rothschild, Abdollahi, &
Pyszczynski, 2009; Sherman et al., 2007; Spencer-Rogers, Major, Forster, & Peng,
2016).
A second line of research suggests that appealing to the value of free speech and
dissent may reduce people’s negative reactions to criticism. Multiple studies on tolerance
has found that free speech framings of rallies and public expression by groups that are
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disliked or that have disliked opinions increases tolerance towards those groups and their
expressions (e.g., Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997; Ramirez & Verkuyten, 2011; see
also Sullivan & Transue, 1999). For example, Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) found
that framing a rally by the KKK (Ku Klux Klan) in terms of free speech rather than
public order lead to increased tolerance of the KKK. Similarly, Ramirez & Verkuyten
(2011) found that framing rallies by right-wing or Islamic groups in terms of civil
liberties rather than public order led to increased tolerance, and that people who
considered freedom of speech to be a relatively important value were more tolerant of
rallies by these disliked groups. Thus, this line of research suggests that priming people
with the value of free speech may make them more tolerant to disliked criticisms and
dissent.
Building on prior work, I propose that in the context of national groups, affirming
a central value of one’s nation (the USA in my case)—the freedom to dissent and
criticize (a core US value; see The Americans Value Poll, 2012)—may reduce defensive
reactions to dissenters who criticize their group even when the group is threatened. If
critical dissent is framed as valuable, then the ingroup critic may be seen as engaging in
an act of constructive patriotism (Schatz, Staub, and Lavine, 1999) and having
benevolent motives toward her or his group.
Goals of the current research
I conducted a series of four experiments to test three hypotheses. First, I
hypothesized that while people will be more persuaded by critical communications from
ingroup rather than outgroup members in the absence of threat, the presence of threat will
eliminate ingroup preference in terms of persuasion, positive attitudes toward the critic,
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and intentions to share the critical communication within one’s social network. Second, I
predicted that the shrinking influence of ingroup critics under threat will be driven by
changing attributions about the critic’s intentions. While ingroup critics will be generally
seen as having more benevolent intentions toward their group than outgroup critics, the
introduction of threat will increase suspicion of malevolent intent, which in turn will
mediate and reduce persuasion and increase negative attitudes and anger toward the
ingroup critic. Third, affirming the freedom to criticize and dissent as a fundamental
value of one’s group will change perceivers’ mindset, preventing them from attributing
malevolent motives to the ingroup critic, which in turn will increase their receptivity to
communications critical about their group even under threat.
Identifying the Study Design through Pilot Studies
To identify the right materials to test these questions, I first conducted a number
of pilot studies. First, while the initial examples of how these phenomena are expressed
were primarily related to physical and national security, Americans tend to be more
concerned with the economy than national security issues (Americans Worry About Job
Security, Affording Retirement, 2015; Gallup, 2017). Therefore, I used initial pilot
studies to create articles that would successfully increase participants’ perceptions of
economic threat and to create critical articles that were also related to the economy and
that generated negative responses from readers. Only once I was able to test my research
questions in the context of economic threat did I them test whether or not they
generalized to the context of national security even among American participants.
Second, I used these initial pilot studies to test which outgroup to use. To avoid
conflating outgroup status with conflict or dislike, I initially used an outgroup critic from
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the United Kingdom in the pilot studies. The results from the pilot studies suggested that
the United Kingdom was too similar to the ingroup, so I settled on a South Korean critic
as the outgroup member, as South Korea is both very distinct from the United States of
America, but also positively regarded.
Therefore, across all four experiments I used nationality to define my groups of
interest—the United States of America as the target ingroup for American participants
and South Korea as a foreign but friendly nation as the target outgroup. Across
experiments I manipulated two different types of threat —economic threat and national
security threat—in search of converging tests of my predictions. I used a wide variety of
outcome variables including persuasion in relation to the critical communication,
attitudes toward the critic (trustworthiness and likeability), emotional reactions to the
communication (particularly negative emotions such as anger), and behavioral intentions
to share the communication with others via social media (Experiments 2-4).
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CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT 1: TESTING WHETHER SITUATIONAL THREAT IMPEDES
OPENESS TO CRITICISM
Experiment 1 used a 3 x 2 between-subjects factorial design and varied Type of
Threat (no threat, economic threat [domestic], and economic threat [global competition])
and Type of Critic (ingroup vs. outgroup). I measured participants’ attitudes toward the
critic, whether or not they were persuaded by the criticism, emotional reactions toward
the critic, and perceived intentions of the critic. I sought to test three research questions
(RQ) in Experiment 1: RQ1, whether people’s response to criticism aimed at their
ingroup would be more favorable when the critic was a fellow ingroup member rather
than an outgroup member; RQ2, if such ingroup preference would be weakened or
eliminated when people felt their ingroup under a cloud of threat; and RQ3, if less
openness to criticism from an ingroup member under threat would be driven by suspicion
about the critic’s motives toward the group.
Method
Participants
Three hundred American participants were recruited through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk to participate in the online study for 50 cents each (age: M = 35.02, SD
= 11.90, range 18-75 years; gender: 51% male, 49% female; race: 75.5% White, 7.7%
Asian-American, 7.4% Black, 6.7% Hispanic, .3% Native American or Pacific Islander,
and 2.4% other; political affiliation: M = 3.24, SD = 1.63 [indicating a centrist political
affiliation with response options ranging from (1) very liberal to (7) very conservative]).
Materials and Procedure
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Participants entered the study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk online work
system. The cover story described the experiment as investigating how people think
about different types of information they encounter on social media.
Threat manipulation
After giving consent, participants were randomly assigned to one of the three
threat conditions. I manipulated economic threat in two ways. In the first threat
condition, participants read an article taking a pessimistic view about the state of the
American economy that emphasized falling wages, wage stagnation, and a corresponding
drop in the quality of life. In the second threat condition participants read the same article
plus an additional paragraph attributing American economic problems to international
competition from other countries succeeding at the expense of the United States. I
included both economic threat articles to explore whether one might be more impactful in
eliciting threat than the other. After reading, participants in both conditions were asked to
spend a minute writing about their reactions to the article. This was done to ensure that
they had read and encoded the material. Those in the third control (“no threat”) condition
did not read any article about the economy and proceeded to the next part of the study.
See Appendix A for Experiment 1 manipulation materials.
Manipulating Critic Type
Next, participants were told that they would see another type of informational
piece popular in social media, namely an op-ed article. They were randomly assigned to
read an opinion article critical of the condition of the United States economy, allegedly
written by a professor with expertise on the American economy who was either an
American (an ingroup member) or a South Korean (an outgroup member from a country
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that is clearly different from the U.S. but one Americans tend to have a positive opinion
of; Gallup, 2014). The opinion article criticized US citizens’ poor work ethic as the
reason for stagnating wages and other economic problems facing the United States. See
Appendix A for Experiment 1 manipulation materials.
Persuasiveness of the criticism
After reading the criticism, participants were asked to report their opinion of the
critical article using five items adapted from Hornsey, Oppes, and Svensson (2002)
including “How persuaded or not persuaded are you by the opinion article you just read?”
Participants responded on 7-point scales with response options ranging from “Not at all
persuaded” (1) to “Completely persuaded” (7). See Appendix B for all dependent
variables used in Experiment 1.
Attitudes toward the critic
Next, they reported their attitudes toward the critic using two items adapted from
Hornsey et al. (2002) including “How trustworthy or untrustworthy is the person who
wrote this opinion article?” They responded on 7-point scales ranging from “Not at all
trustworthy” (1) to “Completely trustworthy” (7).
Emotional reactions
Participants then reported their emotional reactions to the author of the critical
article using two items (e.g. “How angry or not angry do you feel at the person who
wrote this opinion article?”) on 7-point scales ranging from “Not at all angry” (1) to
“Very angry” (7).
Perceived motives of the critic
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I measured participants’ attributions of the critic’s motives using three items (e.g.
“How loyal to America is the person who wrote the opinion article above?”) on 7-point
scales ranging from “Not at all loyal” (1) to “Completely loyal” (7).
Demographics
Finally, participants indicated their gender, age, race, political affiliation (7-point
scale ranging from “Very liberal” [1] to “Very conservative” [7]), citizenship status,
employment.
Results
Initial analyses of variance (ANOVAs) showed no differences in responses
between the two threat conditions, so I combined the two threat conditions for all
following analyses2.
Effect of threat and critic type on attitudes and persuasion
I conducted a series of 2-way ANOVAs crossing Threat (threat, no threat) x Critic
type (ingroup, outgroup) on each of the dependent variables to test my primary prediction
that in the absence of threat, ingroup (American) critics would receive more positive
reactions than outgroup (South Korean) critics, but when economic threat was primed,
that ingroup preference would be reduced or eliminated..
Persuasiveness of the criticism
Participants’ responses to the 5 items measuring persuasion were strongly
intercorrelated (α = .92) and were combined into a single index. An ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect of critic type, F(1, 294) = 19.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .063, showing

2

A pilots study had suggested that people might differ between economic threat that was discussed in a
general way and an economic threat that was discussed with a focus on how it might be part of an
economic struggle with other countries. The results of the present study did not support any differentiation,
and I therefore combined the two threat conditions in all of the analyses.
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that overall American participants were more persuaded by criticism when it came from
an ingroup member (M = 3.63, SD = 1.60) rather than an outgroup member (M = 2.98,
SD = 1.39). As predicted, this was moderated by a significant Threat x Critic Type
interaction, F(1, 294) = 5.89, p = .016, ηp2 = .020, showing that whereas participants in
the no threat condition were significantly more persuaded by criticism from an ingroup
(M = 3.84, SD = 1.55) compared to an outgroup member (M = 2.56, SD = 1.00), t(294) =
4.13, p < .001, d = 0.98, when economic threat was salient, the ingroup persuasion
advantage was significantly reduced (Mingroup = 3.53, SD = 1.62; Moutgroup = 3.15, SD =
1.49), t(294) = 1.81, p = .072, d = 0.24 (see Figure 1 Panel A and Table 1).
Attitudes toward the critic
Two items measuring positive attitudes were combined into a single index (α =
.85). Once again, an ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of critic type, F(1, 294) =
26.07, p < .001, ηp2 = .081, such that Americans preferred the ingroup critic (M = 3.64,
SD = 1.55) over the outgroup critic (M = 2.87, SD = 1.35), which was moderated by a 2way interaction between Threat x Critic type, F(1, 294) = 4.56, p = .034, ηp2 = .015 (see
Figure 1 Panel B). Similar to the previous finding, in the no threat condition participants
preferred the ingroup critic (M = 3.98, SD = 1.36) more than the outgroup critic (M =
2.67, SD = 1.17), t(294) = 4.35, p < .001, d = 1.03. However, when economic threat was
salient this difference was substantially smaller although still significant (Mingroup = 3.49,
SD = 1.62; Moutgroup = 2.95, SD = 1.41), t(294) = 2.67, p = .008, d = 0.36. See Table 1 for
all statistics.
Emotional reactions toward the critic
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Two items measuring negative emotions toward the critic, especially anger, were
combined into a single index (α = .94). An ANOVA showed a significant main effect of
critic type, F(1, 294) = 15.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .049, indicating that Americans felt less
angry at the ingroup critic (M = 3.64, SD = 1.87) than the outgroup critic (M = 4.26, SD =
1.82). This was moderated by a significant Threat x Critic type interaction, F(1, 294) =
9.47, p = .002, ηp2 = .031, such that in the absence of threat, people were less angry at the
ingroup critic (M = 3.27, SD = 1.84) than the outgroup critic (M = 4.86, SD = 1.67),
t(294) = -4.19, p < .001, d = .91, but in the presence of threat, they were equally angry at
both critics (Mingroup = 3.81, SD = 1.86, Moutgroup = 4.00, SD = 1.82), t(294) = 0.74, p =
.463, d = 0.10 (see Figure 1 Panel C and Table 1).
Perceived motives of the critic
Three items measuring perceptions of the critic’s motives in criticizing the U.S.
were combined (α = .94). A subsequent ANOVA showed a large and significant main
effect of critic type, F(1, 294) = 267.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .475, indicating that participants
felt that the ingroup critic had significantly more benevolent motives (M = 3.78, SD =
1.49) than the outgroup critic (M = 1.46, SD = 0.81). A significant Threat x Critic type
interaction, F(1, 294) = 4.62, p = .033, ηp2 = .016, indicated that in the absence of threat
the ingroup critic was viewed as having much more benevolent motives (M = 4.11, SD =
1.45) than the outgroup critic (M = 1.36, SD = 0.79), t(294) = 11.10, p < .001, d = 2.36,
but in the presence of threat, this difference was smaller (Mingroup = 3.62, SD = 1.49,
Moutgroup = 1.51, SD = 0.81), t(294) = 12.74, p < .001, d = 1.76 (see Figure 1 Panel D and
Table 1).
The mediating role of critic’s motives on attitudes, persuasion, and emotion
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I tested the underlying psychological process responsible for threat reducing the
ingroup advantage in attitudes and persuasion. I first examined whether the presence of
threat would magnify suspicion about the critic’s motives and in turn mediate and explain
negative reactions to the critic. And second, I tested whether this mediation would be
stronger for ingroup critics than outgroup critics (moderated mediation; see Figure 2).
Using Hayes’ PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013) and bootstrapping (5000) I
conducted moderated mediation analyses in which threat vs. no threat served as the
predictor, perceptions of the critic’s motives the mediator, and critic type (ingroup or
outgroup) the moderator. Dependent variables included persuasion, attitudes toward the
critic, and negative emotions toward the critic. The moderated mediations for all three
outcome variables were significant (see Table 2 for all statistics).
Results showed that threat (vs. no threat) increased suspicion about the motives of
the critic when he was an ingroup member rather than an outgroup member, B = .64, SE
= .30, 95% CI [.054, 1.229]. Greater suspicion significantly predicted less persuasion
upon reading critic’s opinion, B = .53, SE = .07, 95% CI [.403, .663], less positive
attitudes toward the critic, B = .59, SE = .06, 95% CI [.473, .717], and more anger at the
critic, B = -.46, SE = .09, 95% CI [-.627, -.292]. These mediations were significant for the
ingroup critic. Indirect effects for persuasion, B = -.26, SE = .14, 95% CI [-.542, -.007],
and anger, B = .23, SE = .12, 95% CI [.015, .500], were significant, but the indirect effect
for attitudes was non-significant, B = -.20, SE = .23, 95% CI [-.636, .247]. None of the
equivalent mediations were significant for the outgroup critic: persuasion, B = .08, SE =
.08, 95% CI [-.075, .227], attitudes, B = .20, SE = .23, 95% CI [-.246, .641], and anger, B
= -.07, SE = .07, 95% CI [-.196, .068]. In other words, threat increased suspicion of the
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ingroup critic’s motives which rendered his argument less persuasive and increased anger
toward him, but had no such effect on an outgroup member who levied the same
criticism.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 provide preliminary support for the first hypothesis
by showing that in the absence of threat, people had more favorable attitudes toward an
ingroup critic than an outgroup critic and were more persuaded by criticism of the United
States when it came from an American than a South Korean. The second hypothesis was
also supported showing that whereas the ingroup critic was favored in the absence of
threat, in the presence of threat the ingroup preference disappeared.
The third hypothesis received partial support that the penalty suffered by the
ingroup critic occurred because of increased suspicion that his intentions toward the U.S.
were not benevolent. However, while two of the moderated mediations were significant
(persuasion and negative emotions), one was not (attitudes toward the critic). I believe
this occurred because the items assessing the critic’s motives in criticizing the United
States (the predicted mediator) emphasized loyalty and patriotism, which by definition
can only be used to describe ingroup members, not outgroup members. Because of the
wording of the motivation items, the ingroup critic was always seen as more loyal to the
U.S. than the outgroup critic, which may have weakened the moderated mediations.
Experiment 2 used better measures to assess the critics’ motives toward the U.S. by
assessing whether or not participants viewed them as being America’s well-wisher with
benevolent intentions.
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 2: REPLICATING AND EXTENDING EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 2 sought to replicate and extend the findings of the first experiment in
several ways. First, I designed better items to capture the underlying psychological
mechanism driving people’s reactions to critics and their criticism. Second, I sought to
test whether increased persuasion about the point of view expressed by the criticism
would increase participants’ willingness to share the critical op-ed with friends in their
social network. Third, I increased the number of items assessing each of the dependent
variables to increase the reliability of all measures. Finally, because there was no
difference between the two threat conditions used in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 I
only used the general economic threat condition (without the additional international
competition component).Other than that, Experiment 2 used the same factorial design as
the previous experiment: 2 (Threat Type: economic threat, no threat) x 2 (Critic Type:
American, South Korean) between subjects design. Dependent variables included the
persuasiveness of the criticism, attitudes toward the critic, negative emotions toward the
critic, behavioral intention to share the criticism on social media, and the perceived
motives of the critic.
Method
Participants
Three hundred ninety two American participants were recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to in exchange for 50 cents (age: M = 37.86 years, SD =
13.08, range 18-74 years; gender: 45.2% male, 54.3% female, .5% other; race: 83.7%
White, 6.1% Black, 4.8% Asian American, 2.4% Hispanic, 1.6% Native American or
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Pacific Islander, and 1.3% other; political affiliation: M = 3.48, SD = 1.81 [centrist
political affiliation].
Materials and Procedure
The procedure and cover story for Experiment 2 were identical to that of the
previous experiment.
Threat manipulation
After consenting, participants were randomly assigned to either the threat or no
threat condition. Those in the threat condition were asked to read and respond to a news
article about the state of the economy in the United States. This was the same economic
threat article from Experiment 1 that made no mention of foreign competition. Those in
the no threat (control) condition did not read any article and proceeded to the next part of
the study. After reading the threat article, participants in the threat condition were asked
four questions to assess whether they believed the threat was valid (e.g. “Do you share
the author’s concern about the state of the U.S. economy?”). They were also asked one
multiple choice question to test whether they had read and remembered the information
accurately (“According to this article, how much has average monthly income dropped
since 2008 adjusted for inflation?”; “$200”, “$500”, “$1000”, “Monthly income did not
drop”). See Appendix C for Experiment 2 manipulations, and see Appendix D for all
Experiment 2 measures. These items assessing the believability of the manipulation and
participants’ memory for the information read were new to Experiment 2.
Criticism manipulation
Next, participants were randomly assigned to read an op-ed article critical of
Americans’ work ethic allegedly written by an American or a South Korean writer. This
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article and the byline describing the authors were identical to the previous experiment.
After reading the op-ed, participants were asked a few open-ended questions about the
content aimed at ensuring that they had paid attention to the article. This included
questions about the type of article they read (e.g. was it news or opinion, etc.) and the
identity of the author including his group membership. See Appendix C for Experiment 2
manipulations, and see Appendix D for all Experiment 2 measures.
Persuasiveness of the criticism
After reading the critical op-ed, participants reported how persuaded they were by
the opinion in the critical article using six items; five original items from Experiment 1
and one new item. See Appendix D for all measures.
Attitudes toward the critic
Next, they reported their attitudes toward the critic using six items; two original
items from Experiment 1 plus four new ones.
Emotional reactions
Participants reported their emotions toward the op-ed author using five items; two
original items from Experiment 1 and three new items.
Behavioral intentions
Three new items were used to assess participants’ intentions to share this article
with their friends through social media and read other articles by the same author (e.g.
“Would you be willing to share this article on social media?”). Responses were given on
7-point scales ranging from “Not at all” (1) to “Very much” (7).
Perceived motives of the critic
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Six new items were used to assess participants’ attributions about the critic’s
motives (e.g. “In your opinion, does the author of this article care about the United
States?”) on 7-point scales ranging from “Does not care at all” (1) to “Cares very much”
(7).
Demographics
Finally, participants indicated their gender, age, race, political affiliation,
citizenship status, employment. See Appendix D for all Experiment 2 measures.
Results
Effect of threat and critic type on reactions to the critic and the criticism
Once again, I conducted a series of 2-way ANOVAs crossing Threat (threat, no
threat) x Critic type (ingroup, outgroup) for each of the dependent variables.
Persuasiveness of the criticism
When all six items measuring persuasion were used as a combined measure (α =
.94), I found a significant main effect of critic type, F(1, 388) = 8.27, p = .004, ηp2 =
.021, showing that the ingroup critic was more persuasive (M = 3.38, SD = 1.70) than the
outgroup critic (M = 2.87, SD = 1.53). A significant main effect of threat, F(1, 388) =
5.53, p = .020, ηp2 = .014, indicated that criticism was more persuasive when delivered in
the absence (M = 3.29, SD = 1.64) rather than in the presence of threat (M = 2.91, SD =
1.61). As predicted, these main effects were moderated by a significant interaction
between Threat x Critic Type, F(1, 388) = 4.52, p = .034, ηp2 = .012, showing that in the
absence of threat, criticism was more persuasive coming from an ingroup member (M =
3.70, SD = 1.63) than an outgroup member (M = 2.89, SD = 1.55), t(383) = 3.76, p <
.001, d = .20. In the presence of threat, this ingroup preference was eliminated (Mingroup =
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2.97, SD = 1.71; Moutgroup = 2.85, SD = 1.52), t(388) = 0.50, p = .616, d = .07 (see Figure
3 Panel A and Table 3).
Attitudes toward the critic
When all six items measuring attitudes toward the critic were used as the
dependent variable (α = .94), a significant main effect of critic type, F(1, 388) = 18.59, p
< .001, ηp2 = .046, indicated that Americans had more positive attitudes toward the
ingroup critic (M = 3.61, SD = 1.47) than the outgroup critic (M = 2.97, SD = 1.33). A
significant main effect of threat, F(1, 388) = 8.78, p = .003, ηp2 = .022, indicated less
positive attitudes in the presence (M = 3.05, SD = 1.40) than in the absence of threat (M =
3.47, SD = 1.44). These main effects were moderated by a marginal 2-way interaction
between Threat x Critic type, F(1, 388) = 3.53, p = .061, ηp2 = .009. When disaggregated,
the interaction indicated that in the absence of threat people had more positive attitudes
toward an ingroup (M = 3.91, SD = 1.34) than an outgroup critic (M = 3.04, SD = 1.42),
t(388) = 4.66, p < .001, d = .63. But in the presence of threat, this ingroup favoritism
disappeared (Mingroup = 3.23, SD = 1.55; Moutgroup = 2.89, SD = 1.23), t(388) = 1.62, p =
.105, d = .24 (see Figure 3 Panel B and Table 3).
Emotional reactions
Five items measuring negative emotions especially anger, were combined into a
single index (α = .94). A significant main effect of critic type, F(1, 388) = 8.51, p = .004,
ηp2 = .022, indicated that people were less angry at the ingroup critic (M = 4.18, SD =
1.77) than the outgroup critic (M = 4.73, SD = 1.71). Another significant main effect of
threat, F(1, 388) = 7.22, p = .008, ηp2 = .018, indicated that they were also less angry at
critics in the absence of threat (M = 4.25, SD = 1.77) than the presence of threat (M =
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4.72, SD = 1.72). As predicted, this was moderated by a significant interaction between
Threat x Critic type, F(1, 388) = 4.38, p = .037, ηp2 = .011, indicating that when threat
was absent, people were less angry at the ingroup critic (M = 3.81, SD = 1.69) than the
outgroup critic (M = 4.69, SD = 1.75), t(388) = -3.77, p < .001, d = .51. But when threat
was present, this ingroup advantage was eliminated (Mingroup = 4.65, SD = 1.79, Moutgroup =
4.79, SD = 1.66), F(388) = -0.55, p = .581, d = .08 (see Figure 3 Panel C and Table 3).
Behavioral intentions
After combining the three items measuring behavioral intentions into a single
index (α = .92), an ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of critic type, F(1, 388) =
4.67, p = .031, ηp2 = .012, indicating that Americans were more willing to share the
critical article on social media when it was written by an ingroup critic (M = 2.97, SD =
2.02) than an outgroup critic (M = 2.49, SD = 1.77). A significant main effect of threat,
F(1, 388) = 7.80, p = .006, ηp2 = .020, indicated more willingness to share the criticism in
the absence (M = 2.96, SD = 1.97) than presence of threat (M = 2.44, SD = 1.79). This
was moderated by a significant interaction between Threat x Critic type, F(1, 388) = 9.10,
p = .003, ηp2 = .023, such that under no threat people were more willing to share
criticism written by the ingroup critic (M = 3.45, SD = 1.99) than the outgroup critic (M =
2.47, SD = 1.82), t(388) = 3.90, p < .001, d = .51, but when threat became salient, they
were equally unwilling to share the criticism with others on social media (Mingroup = 2.35,
SD = 1.89, Moutgroup = 2.52, SD = 1.71), t(388) = .57, p = .567, d = .09 (see Figure 3 Panel
D and Table 3).
Perceptions of the critic’s motives
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After combining participants’ responses to all items measuring perceptions of the
critic’s motives into a single index (α = .95) I conducted a ANOVA which revealed a
large significant main effect of critic type, F(1, 388) = 181.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .319,
showing that Americans felt that the ingroup critic (M = 4.30, SD = 1.60) had more
benevolent motives in criticizing the U.S. than the outgroup critic (M = 2.31, SD = 1.26).
A main effect of threat, F(1, 388) = 8.15, p = .005, ηp2 = .021, similarly indicated that
they believed both critics had more benign motives if the criticism was read in the
absence of threat (M = 3.48, SD = 1.82) than the presence of threat (M = 3.06, SD =
1.64). These main effects were superseded by a significant interaction between Threat x
Critic type, F(1, 388) = 12.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .032, showing that in the absence of threat,
the ingroup critic was seen as having more benevolent motives (M = 4.71, SD = 1.40)
than the outgroup critic (M = 2.26, SD = 1.28), t(388) = 12.86, p < .001, d = 1.83. But in
the presence of threat, the ingroup advantage was substantially decreased, although still
statistically significant (Mingroup = 3.78, SD = 1.68, Moutgroup = 2.37, SD = 1.25), t(388) =
6.62, p < .001, d = .95 (see Figure 3 Panel E and Table 3).
The mediating role of critic motives on attitudes, persuasion, emotions, and
behavioral intentions
I tested whether the presence of threat would magnify suspicion about the critic’s
intentions and in turn mediate and explain negative reactions toward the critic, and
whether this mediation would be stronger for ingroup than outgroup critics. I conducted
moderated mediation analyses using Hayes’s PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013)
and bootstrapping (5000), in which threat vs. no threat served as the predictor, perceived
motives of the critic the mediator, and critic type (ingroup or outgroup) the moderator.
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Dependent variables included persuasion, attitudes toward the critic, emotions toward the
critic, and behavioral intentions. The overall moderated mediations for all four dependent
variables were significant (see Table 4 for all statistics).
Specifically, in the presence of threat (vs. no threat) participants were more
suspicious of criticism coming from the ingroup member compared to the outgroup
member, B = 1.03, SE = .29, 95% CI [.466, 1.590]; greater suspicion significantly
predicted less persuasion, B = .79, SE = .04, 95% CI [.703, .868], less positive attitudes
toward the critic, B = .73, SE = .03, 95% CI [.663, .796], more anger at the critic, B = .73, SE = .05, 95% CI [-.830, -.633], and less willingness to share the critical article on
social media, B = .76, SE = .06, 95% CI [.649, .866]. These mediations were only
significant for the ingroup critic: indirect effects for persuasion, B = -.72, SE = .18, 95%
CI [-1.083, -.385]; positive attitudes, B = -.67, SE = .17, 95% CI [-.993, -.341]; anger, B =
.68, SE = .17, 95% CI [.345, 1.010]; and willingness to share the article, B = -.70, SE =
.18, 95% CI [-1.048, -.356]. None of the mediations were significant for the outgroup
critic: persuasion, B = .08, SE = .14, 95% CI [-.194, .359]; attitudes, B = .08, SE = .13,
95% CI [-.173, .337]; anger, B = -.07, SE = .13, 95% CI [-.340, .183]; and willingness to
share the criticism, B = .08, SE = .14, 95% CI [-.191, .349]. In other words, external
threat increased suspicion of the ingroup critic’s motives which made people’s reactions
more negative, but had no effect on the outgroup critic.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 nicely replicate Experiment 1 by showing that at
baseline, participants were more open to criticism about their country when it came from
a fellow countryman than a foreign citizen. But when reminded of economic distress in
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the nation, people closed ranks and became resistant to all criticism of their nation,
regardless of the critic’s nationality. Importantly, this interaction effect was due to
changing evaluations of the American (or ingroup) critic. The reminder of economic
threat (vs. no reminder) made participants penalize the American critic, but had no effect
on their evaluations of the foreign critic. Mediational analyses confirmed this was
because people became suspicious about the motives of the American critic when under
threat—thinking that he did not have the nation’s best interest at heart.
The findings of Experiment 2 advance the results of Experiment 1 in two
important ways. First, Experiment 2 provided stronger evidence of mediation—that threat
made people question the benevolence of the ingroup (American) critic’s motives, which
did not happen for the outgroup (South Korean) critic. This increased suspicion about the
ingroup critic’s motives was responsible for reducing the persuasive power of his
communication, decreasing liking and trust, increasing anger toward him, and so on. A
second contribution of Experiment 2 is that it extended earlier findings by showing that
the impact of threat and subsequent suspicion about the ingroup critic made participants
more wary about sharing their critical opinion with others in their social network, which
is an important step in getting fellow ingroup members engaged with critical reflection
about the ingroup.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT 3: TESTING THE PHENOMENON IN A NATIONAL SECURITY
CONTEXT
In Experiment 3 I sought to replicate and extend my prior findings to a different
type of threat that has been highly salient in American society since September 11,
2001—namely national security threat. In the 15 years since 9/11 there has been
heightened focus on protecting the American people against threats to national security,
which has raised counter-concerns about chipping away individual civil liberties. The rise
of ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and their successful attacks in the Middle
East, Europe, and the U.S. have increased Americans’ national security fears (Pew
Research Center, 2016). At the same time, Americans are becoming more concerned
about their civil liberties and privacy in the wake of revelations about security
organizations spying on American citizens, most notably in the revelations of former
C.I.A. employee Edward Snowden (Rainie, 2016). In other words, there is considerable
tension between competing goals of protecting the U.S. against national security threats
and protecting the civil liberties of American citizens and residents (Finkelstein et al.,
2016; Rainie & Maniam, 2016).
Experiment 3 examined this issue by drawing attention to national security threat
in the threat manipulation in lieu of economic threat used in prior experiments. The topic
of criticism was an op-ed that took the position that the American government tends to
trample individual civil liberties in the interest of protecting national security. The
critique made an argument for why civil liberties deserve more attention even if it means
occasionally deemphasizing national security. As in previous experiments, the alleged
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author of the critical op-ed was either an American citizen or a South Korean citizen.
Thus, threat in Experiment 3 involved manipulating national security threat instead of
economic threat and using a no threat control condition.
In sum, this experiment used a 2 Threat Type (national security threat vs. no
threat) x 2 Critic Type (American, South Korean) between-subjects design. I measured
whether threat type and critic type would influence how persuasive participants found the
criticism, their attitudes toward the critic, anger toward the critic, attributions about the
critic’s motives, and behavioral intentions to share the critical article on social media.
Method
Participants
I recruited 299 American participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to
participate in this study for 50 cents each (age: M = 37.17 years, SD = 12.08, range 18-72
years; gender: 58.4% female, 41.3% male, .3% other; race: 80.9% White, 6% Black,
5.7% Hispanic, 3.7% Asian American, 1.7% Native American or Pacific Islander, and
2% other; political affiliation: M = 3.48, SD = 1.79 [centrist] on a 7-point scale ranging
from “very liberal” [1] to “very conservative” [7]).
Materials and Procedure
The procedure and cover story for Experiment 3 were identical to the previous
experiments and are not described again. The threat and criticism manipulations were
changed and described below.
Threat manipulation
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: threat or no threat
conditions. Those in the threat condition read an article about the growing frequency of
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terrorist incidents in the U.S. and the difficulty containing such incidents. After reading
the threat article, participants were asked four questions measuring whether they believed
the information they had read and testing their memory (see Appendix E for Experiment
3 materials). Participants in the control condition did not read any article on threat, and
proceeded to the next part of the study.
Criticism manipulation
Next, participants were randomly assigned to read an opinion article critical of
national security policy and law enforcement for trampling on individual civil liberties
rights, both in the U.S. and outside, while overemphasizing national security. The article
argued that protecting civil liberties should take precedence over national security
concerns and offered ways to increase respect for civil liberties. As in prior experiments,
I manipulated the nationality of the article’s author by presenting him as a national
security expert on issues related to the United States who was either an American or a
South Korean university professor. After reading the criticism, participants were asked a
few open-ended questions about the article to ensure that they had paid attention to its
contents. This included questions about the type of article they had just read (e.g. news,
opinion, etc.), and the nationality of the author (see Appendix E for details).
Dependent variables
I measured the same five clusters of dependent variables as in Experiment 2:
persuasiveness of the article, attitudes toward the critic, emotional reactions to the critic,
behavioral intentions, and perceptions of the critic’s motives (see Appendix D).
Demographics
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Finally, participants reported their age, gender, citizenship status, their race or
ethnicity, and their national identity (attachment and glorification subscales, adapted from
Roccas, Klar, & Leviatan, 2006; see also Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla,
2010). They were all then debriefed and paid for their participation.
Results
Effect of threat and critic type on reactions to the critic and the criticism
As in prior experiments I conducted a series of 2-way ANOVAs crossing Threat
(threat, no threat) x Critic type (ingroup, outgroup) on each of the dependent variables.
Persuasiveness of the criticism
When the six items measuring persuasion were combined and used as a dependent
variable (α = .93), I found a significant main effect of critic type, F(1, 295) = 6.03, p =
.015, ηp2 = .020, showing that the ingroup critic was more persuasive (M = 4.30, SD =
1.50) than the outgroup critic (M = 3.87, SD = 1.52). This main effect was moderated by
a significant interaction between Threat x Critic Type, F(1, 295) = 7.28, p = .007, ηp2 =
.024, that mirrored Experiments 1-2. Specifically, in the absence of threat, criticism from
an ingroup member was more persuasive (M = 4.54, SD = 1.56) than from an outgroup
member (M = 3.64, SD = 1.58), t(295) = 3.67, p < .001, d = .57. In the presence of threat,
this ingroup preference was eliminated (Mingroup = 4.04, SD = 1.40; Moutgroup = 4.08, SD =
1.44), t(295) = -.17, p = .866, d = .03 (see Figure 4 Panel A and Table 5).
Attitudes toward the critic
When the six items measuring attitudes toward the critic (α = .94) were used as a
dependent variable I replicated prior experiments again. A significant main effect of critic
type, F(1, 295) = 7.27, p = .007, ηp2 = .024, indicated that Americans had more positive
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attitudes toward the ingroup critic (M = 4.36, SD = 1.26) than the outgroup critic (M =
3.96, SD = 1.25). A significant 2-way interaction between Threat x Critic type, F(1, 295)
= 7.06, p = .008, ηp2 = .023, indicated that in the absence of threat people had more
positive attitudes toward an ingroup (M = 4.55, SD = 1.36) than an outgroup critic (M =
3.78, SD = 1.29), t(295) = 3.81, p < .001, d = .58. However, in the presence of threat, this
ingroup favoritism disappeared (Mingroup = 4.14, SD = 1.12; Moutgroup = 4.13, SD = 1.18),
t(295) = -.03, p = .979, d = .01 (see Figure 4 Panel B and Table 5).
Emotional reactions
The five negative emotion items were combined into a single index (α = .95). An
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of critic type, F(1, 295) = 13.16, p < .001, ηp2
= .043, indicating that people were less angry at the ingroup critic (M = 3.25, SD = 1.68)
than the outgroup critic (M = 3.97, SD = 1.77). As predicted, this was moderated by a
significant interaction between Threat x Critic type, F(1, 295) = 6.28, p = .013, ηp2 =
.021, indicating that in the absence of threat people were less angry at the ingroup critic
(M = 3.06, SD = 1.71) than the outgroup critic (M = 4.28, SD = 1.76), t(295) = -4.37, p <
.001, d = .70. But in the presence of threat, this ingroup advantage was eliminated
(Mingroup = 3.45, SD = 1.62, Moutgroup = 3.67, SD = 1.74), t(295) = -.79, p = .431, d = .13
(see Figure 4 Panel C and Table 5).
Behavioral intentions
Participants’ responses to the three behavioral intentions items were combined
into a single index (α = .91). A marginally significant interaction between Threat x Critic
type, F(1, 293) = 3.29, p = .071, ηp2 = .011, indicated that in the absence of threat people
were more willing to share the critical op-ed on social media if it came from the ingroup
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(M = 3.51, SD = 1.89) than outgroup critic (M = 2.81, SD = 1.72), t(293) = 2.32, p = .021,
d = .39. But in the presence of threat, they were equally unwilling to share the criticism
regardless of the critic’s identity (Mingroup = 3.12, SD = 1.88, Moutgroup = 3.20, SD = 1.83),
t(293) = -.26, p = .799, d = .04 (see Figure 4 Panel D and Table 5).
Perceptions of the critic’s motives
As before, six items measuring inferences about the critic’s motives toward the
U.S. were combined into a single index (α = .93). A significant main effect of critic type,
F(1, 295) = 90.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .235, indicated that Americans felt that the ingroup
critic (M = 5.22, SD = 1.37) had more benevolent motives than the outgroup critic (M =
3.71, SD = 1.37). These main effects were moderated by a marginally significant
interaction between Threat x Critic type, F(1, 295) = 3.59, p = .059, ηp2 = .012, showing
that in the absence of threat, the ingroup advantage remained (Mingroup = 5.35, SD = 1.41,
Moutgroup = 3.55, SD = 1.37), t(295) = 8.13, p < .001, d = 1.29. But in the presence of
threat, the ingroup advantage was diminished (Mingroup = 5.07, SD = 1.31, Moutgroup = 3.87,
SD = 1.36), t(295) = 5.35, p < .001, d = .90 (see Figure 4 Panel E and Table 5).
The mediating role of critic motives on attitudes, persuasion, emotions, and
behavioral intentions
I tested whether threat would predict increased suspicion about the critic’s
motives and in turn mediate negative reactions toward the critic especially for the ingroup
critic. Hayes’s PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013) and bootstrapping (5000) were
used to conduct moderated mediation analyses in which threat vs. no threat served as the
predictor, perceived motives of the critic the mediator, and critic type (ingroup or
outgroup) the moderator. The proposed mediations were nonsignificant (see Table 6 for
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all statistics). Although threat increased suspicion about the motives of the ingroup critic
relative to the outgroup critic, the interaction effect (Threat x Critic Type) for the critic’s
motive was only marginally significant. Because motive, the proposed mediator,
produced weaker results it rendered the moderated mediations nonsignificant unlike prior
experiments. In the discussion below, I speculate about why the motive results might
have been marginal in this experiment.
The moderating role of national glorification
As Experiment 3 focused on national security and nationalism more directly than
the previous Experiments, I tested whether people’s openness to criticism depended not
only on situational threat and the identity of the critic, but also on their national identity.
Specifically, I tested whether people with different individual levels of glorification
(glorifying the United States as superior to all other countries) would respond differently
to ingroup and outgroup criticism as a function of whether or not they had been primed
with threat.
I found significant three-way interactions between glorification (statistically
controlling for attachment), threat, and the critic’s identity for attitudes toward the critic,
F(1, 290) = 5.37, p = .021, ηp2 = .018; emotional reactions, F(1, 290) = 6.71, p = .010,
ηp2 = .023; and perceived motives of the critic, F(1, 290) = 4.55, p = .034, ηp2 = .016.
The interaction between glorification, threat, and the critic’s identity on persuasiveness of
the criticism was marginally significant, F(1, 290) = 2.82, p = .094, ηp2 = .010, and the
interaction on behavioral intentions was not significant, F(1, 290) = 1.52, p = .218, ηp2 =
.005. Specifically, participants who were relatively low in national glorification did not
differ in openness to criticism from ingroup and outgroup critics regardless of whether
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the criticism was delivered in the absence (Persuasiveness of the criticism: t(290) = 0.51,
p = .608; Attitudes toward the Critic: t(290) = 0.20, p = .842; Emotional Reactions: t(290)
= -0.39, p = .694; Perceived Motives of the Critic: t(290) = 3.49, p < .001) or presence
(Persuasiveness of the criticism: t(290) = -0.38, p = .704; Attitudes toward the Critic:
t(290) = -0.22, p = .824; Emotional Reactions: t(290) = -0.73, p = .465; Perceived
Motives of the Critic: t(290) = 3.89, p < .001) of threat. In contrast, participants who were
relatively high in national glorification were more open to criticism from an ingroup than
an outgroup critic in the absence of threat (Persuasiveness of the criticism: t(290) = 4.37,
p < .001; Attitudes toward the Critic: t(290) = 5.21, p < .001; Emotional Reactions: t(290)
= -5.31, p < .001; Perceived Motives of the Critic: t(290) = 7.97, p < .001) than in the
presence of threat (Persuasiveness of the criticism: t(290) = -0.01, p = .993; Attitudes
toward the Critic: t(290) = 0.01, p = .994; Emotional Reactions: t(290) = -0.27, p = .784;
Perceived Motives of the Critic: t(290) = 3.61, p < .001). Thus, it appears that when the
national context is particularly salient, people who glorify their country and the most
likely to penalize fellow ingroup members who criticize when the group is under threat.
Discussion
Using a different form of threat (national security) and a different type of
criticism (criticizing the American government for violating individual civil liberties),
Experiment 3 replicated all prior findings from Experiments 1 and 2 with the exception of
the moderated mediation. As in prior experiments, results from Experiment 3 showed that
in the absence of threat, people were more open to criticism from a fellow American
rather than a foreigner. When national security threat was made salient, however, this
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ingroup advantage was eliminated or diminished, with people being equally closed to
criticism about their nation’s policies from an American as well as a foreigner.
In contrast to previous experiments, however, the predicted moderated mediation
did not emerge. I speculate that this may have occurred because national security threat
(in Experiment 3) is a type of external threat coming from outside the group whereas
economic threat (used in Experiments 1-2) is an internal threat emanating from within the
group. Because national security threat comes from outside the group and primes
intergroup conflict, it may harden group boundaries making people more resistant to
critiques from outgroup members relative to ingroup members, which would explain why
the Threat x Critic Type interaction was only marginally significant. Another possibility
is that Americans are more concerned about the economy than they are about national
security concerns (Americans Worry About Job Security, Affording Retirement, 2015;
Gallup, 2017), and these effects may therefore be more difficult to capture. Additionally,
although psychological theories about threat often treat threats to physical and economic
safety similarly (e.g., Maslow, 1943; Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios Morrison, 2009), people
may be expected to respond differently to absolute threats to physical safety such as death
and threats to economic stability. Finally, the critical message in Experiment 3 was
designed to be more explicitly constructive by proposing a solution and a way forward
from the problem that was being criticized. This may have diluted the strength of the
effect in Experiment 3.
Nonetheless, taken together, Experiments 1, 2, and 3 provide replicable evidence
showing that while ingroup critics generally have an advantage convincing listeners
about the ways in which their group needs to change compared to outgroup members, this
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ingroup advantage is eliminated when listeners feel that their group is threatened in some
way. The resulting unwillingness to entertain criticism even from an insider under threat
suggests a defensive reaction, preventing learning and course correction on the part of the
group. What might remedy such defensiveness and create greater openness to critical
feedback about one’s ingroup? That is the focus of Experiment 4.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENT 4: TESTING A FREE SPEECH INTERVENTION
The goal of Experiment 4 was to design an intervention to increase people’s
openness to criticism about their group, especially when their group is under the specter
of threat. One promising intervention involves vale affirmation. Based on past research
showing that affirming important values protects the self and one’s group against threat
(e.g. Derks, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2006; Rothschild, Abdollahi, & Pyszczynski, 2009;
Sherman et al., 2007), I propose that affirming core values of one’s national group—
especially values that emphasize dissent and free speech—might serve as an effective
remedy. Thus, in Experiment 4, I reminded participants that dissent and criticism are
important values protected by the American constitution (i.e., dissent is patriotic), and
investigated whether such value affirmation would increase the persuasiveness of the
critical op-ed, increase positive attitudes toward the critic, and erase doubts about the
critic’s motives. I had two competing predictions. First, a reminder that dissent and free
speech are fundamental American values might increase openness to criticism regardless
of who the critic is (ingroup or outgroup member) even under threat. Alternatively, such a
reminder might increase openness to criticism only from ingroup critics when under
threat.
Experiment 4 tested these competing hypotheses using a 2 Threat Type (economic
threat, no threat) x 2 Critic Type (ingroup, outgroup) x 2 Value Affirmation (free speech
affirmed, not affirmed) between subjects factorial design. I returned to economic threat
and criticism about Americans’ work ethic identical to Experiments 1 and 2. The
dependent measures were also identical to the prior two experiments.
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Method
Participants
Five hundred and fifty one (N = 551) American participants were recruited
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to participate in the study in exchange for 70 cents
(age: M = 36.60 years, SD = 12.40, range 18-83 years; gender: 47.0% male, 52.7%
female, .3% other; race: 79.3% White, 8.8% Black, 4.8% Asian American, 4.7%
Hispanic, .9% Native American or Pacific Islander, and 1.6% other; centrist political
affiliation: M = 3.44, SD = 1.83 on a 7-point scale ranging from “very liberal” (1) to
“very conservative (7).
Materials and Procedure
The procedure and cover story were identical to that of the previous experiments.
The manipulations of economic threat and criticism were identical to Experiment 2.
Value affirmation: Criticism and free speech are American values
Half the participants read a short statement above the critical op-ed allegedly
written by the editorial board of the newspaper that stated: “At this newspaper, we
strongly believe that the American value of free speech is an important part of what
makes the United States great because it encourages debate around a diversity of
opinions. That’s why, in this newspaper, we bring you a wide variety of opinions.” At the
end of the experiment, participants were presented with an attention check asking them to
identify the editorial board’s statement from multiple options (see Appendix F for
materials new to Experiment 4).
Results and Discussion
Effect of threat, critic type, and value affirmation on attitudes and persuasion
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To test whether value affirmation would influence participants’ responses to
criticism I conducted a series of ANOVAs crossing Threat (threat, no threat) x Critic
Type (ingroup, outgroup) x Value Affirmation (affirmation, no affirmation) on all
dependent variables.
Persuasiveness of the criticism
When all six items measuring persuasion were combined into a single dependent
variable (α = .93) results revealed no main effects but several significant two-way
interaction effects (see Tables 7 & 8 for more details). First, as predicted, I found a
significant Value x Threat interaction, F(1, 543) = 5.26, p = .022, ηp2 = .010, indicating
that when free speech was not affirmed, people were less persuaded by criticism
delivered under a cloud of threat (M = 2.99, SD = 1.44) compared to no threat (M = 3.40,
SD = 1.70) , t(543) = 2.37, p = .018, d = .26. However, when free speech was affirmed,
persuasion was equalized regardless of threat (Mno threat = 3.08, SD = 1.44; Mthreat = 3.28,
SD = 1.63), t(543) = -.99, p = .322, d = .13 (see Figure 5 Panel A). This finding indicates
that value affirmation increased Americans’ openness to criticism about their nation even
when they perceived a threat to their nation.
Second, a marginally significant Value x Critic Type interaction, F(1, 543) =
2.74, p = .098, ηp2 = .005, indicated that when the value of free speech was not affirmed,
the ingroup critic was viewed as more persuasive (M = 3.41, SD = 1.65) than the
outgroup critic (M = 2.97, SD = 1.49), t(543) = 2.59, p = .010, d = .28. However, when
free speech was affirmed both critics were equally persuasive (Mingroup = 3.19, SD = 1.56;
Moutgroup = 3.15, SD = 1.51), t(543) = .03, p = .969, d = .03 (see Figure 5 Panel B). This
indicates that value affirmation equated perceivers’ openness to criticism about their
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nation regardless of the group membership of the critic. The 3-way interaction between
Value Affirmation x Threat x Critic Type was nonsignificant, F(1, 543) = .02, p = .895,
ηp2 < .001.
Third, a significant Threat x Critic Type interaction, F(1, 543) = 4.68, p = .031,
ηp2 = .009, replicated Experiments 1-3. That is, in the absence of threat, criticism from an
ingroup member was more persuasive (M = 3.52, SD = 1.69) than criticism from an
outgroup member (M = 2.99, SD = 1.45), t(543) = 2.81, p = .005, d = .34. But in the
presence of threat, this ingroup preference was eliminated (Mingroup = 3.10, SD = 1.50;
Moutgroup = 3.12, SD = 1.55), t(543) = -.31, p = .757, d = .01.
Attitudes toward the critic
Six items measuring attitudes toward the critic were combined (α = .93). An
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of threat, F(1, 543) = 4.55, p = .033, ηp2 =
.008 indicating that people held more positive attitudes toward critics in the absence (M =
3.57, SD = 1.32) rather than presence (M = 3.28, SD = 1.38) of threat. And a significant
main effect of critic type, F(1, 543) = 5.84, p = .016, ηp2 = .011 indicated preference for
ingroup (M = 3.59, SD = 1.39) over outgroup (M = 3.27, SD = 1.30) critics.
Several two-way interaction effects replicated the findings obtained for
persuasion described above (see Tables 7 & 8 for more details). First, and important to
this experiment, as predicted, affirming the value of free speech moderated reactions to
criticism. A significant Value x Threat interaction, F(1, 543) = 6.00, p = .015, ηp2 = .011,
indicated that in the absence of value affirmation, people expressed less positive attitudes
toward the critics in the context of economic threat (M = 3.14, SD = 1.31) compared to no
threat (M = 3.65, SD = 1.41), t(543) = 3.52, p < .001, d = .37. However, when the value
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of free speech was affirmed, threat had no effect on attitudes toward critics (Mthreat = 3.50,
SD = 1.45; Mno threat = 3.47, SD = 1.20), t(543) = -.21, p = .835, d = .02 (Figure 5 Panel
C).
Second, a Value x Critic Type interaction, F(1, 543) = 5.41, p = .020, ηp2 = .010,
indicated that while ingroup critics were evaluated more positively (M = 3.66, SD = 1.43)
than outgroup critics (M = 3.13, SD = 1.29) in the absence of value affirmation, t(543) =
3.64, p < .001, d = .39, both critics were evaluated equally positively in the presence of
value affirmation (Mingroup = 3.50, SD = 1.33; Moutgroup = 3.46, SD = 1.31), t(543) = .06, p
= .952, d = .03 (Figure 5 Panel D). The 3-way interaction between Value Affirmation x
Threat x Critic Type was nonsignificant, F(1, 543) = .03, p = .860, ηp2 < .001. See Table
7 for all descriptive and inferential statistics.
Third, replicating Experiments 1-3, a significant interaction between Threat x
Critic Type, F(1, 543) = 8.79, p = .003, ηp2 = .016, showed that in the absence of threat,
people preferred the ingroup critic (M = 3.89, SD = 1.36) over the outgroup critic (M =
3.25, SD = 1.19), t(543) = 3.90, p < .001, d = .50. But in the presence of threat, this
ingroup preference was eliminated (Mingroup = 3.28, SD = 1.34; Moutgroup = 3.29, SD =
1.42), t(543) = -.38, p = .706, d < .01.
Emotional reactions
Participants’ negative emotions (α = .95) replicated most of the findings described
above (see Tables 7 & 8 for details). I found significant two-way interactions similar to
those obtained for attitudes and persuasion. First, a marginal Value x Critic Type
interaction, F(1, 543) = 3.45, p = .064, ηp2 = .006, suggested that while people were less
angry at ingroup critics (M = 4.04, SD = 1.80) than outgroup critics (M = 4.59, SD =
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1.80) when the value of free speech was not affirmed, t(543) = -2.71, p = .007, d = .31,
anger toward both critics was equalized when free speech had been affirmed (ingroup M
= 4.33, SD = 1.79; outgroup M = 4.34, SD = 1.91), t(543) = .11, p = .909, d < .01 (Figure
6 Panel A).
Second, a significant interaction between Threat x Critic Type, F(1, 543) = 5.31, p
= .022, ηp2 = .010, showed that in the absence of threat, people were less angry at an
ingroup critic (M = 3.91, SD = 1.80) than an outgroup critic (M = 4.56, SD = 1.72), t(543)
= -2.89, p = .004, d = .37. But in the presence of threat, this ingroup preference was
eliminated (Mingroup = 4.44, SD = 1.76; Moutgroup = 4.40, SD = 1.98), t(543) = .43, p = .667,
d = .02.
The interaction between Value x Threat, F(1, 543) = .51, p = .475, ηp2 < .001
(Figure 6 Panel B), and the 3-way interaction between Value Affirmation x Threat x
Critic Type, F(1, 543) = .00, p = .957, ηp2 < .001, were nonsignificant.
Behavioral intentions
Three items measuring willingness to share the critical article via social media
were combined into a single index (α = .88). I found three interaction effects similar to
those reported above for attitudes and persuasion. First, a significant Value x Threat
interaction, F(1, 543) = 4.65, p = .032 ηp2 = .009, indicated that when the value of free
speech was not affirmed, people were less willing to share the critical op-ed when they
felt their group was under a cloud of threat (M = 2.33, SD = 1.51) as compared to no
threat (M = 2.88, SD = 1.80), t(543) = 2.97, p = .003, d = .33. However, when the value
of free speech was affirmed, they were equally willing to share the critical op-ed
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regardless of threat (Mno threat = 2.64, SD = 1.62; Mthreat = 2.69, SD = 1.90), t(543) = -.29, p
= .772, d = .03 (Figure 6 Panel C).
Second a Value x Critic Type interaction, F(1, 543) = 9.82, p = .002, ηp2 = .018,
showed that when the value of free speech was not affirmed people were more willing to
share criticism on social media if it came from ingroup critics (M = 2.88, SD = 1.79) than
outgroup critics (M = 2.32, SD = 1.51), t(543) = 2.98, p = .003, d = .34, however, when
the value of free speech was affirmed they were equally willing to share criticism
regardless of the critic’s identity (Mingroup = 2.51, SD = 1.66; Moutgroup = 2.82, SD = 1.82),
t(543) = -1.57, p = .117, d = .18 (Figure 6 Panel D).
Third, a significant interaction between Threat x Critic Type, F(1, 543) = 6.91, p
= .009, ηp2 = .013, showed that in the absence of threat, people were more willing to
share criticism on social media if it came from an ingroup critic (M = 3.03, SD = 1.88)
than an outgroup critic (M = 2.51, SD = 1.51), t(543) = 2.45, p = .015, d = .30. But in the
presence of threat, ingroup preference was eliminated (Mingroup = 2.39, SD = 1.53;
Moutgroup = 2.56, SD = 1.83), t(543) = -1.30, p = .196, d = .10 (see Tables 7 & 8 for more
details).
Perceptions of the critic’s motives
Six items measuring perceived motives of the critic were combined together (α =
.95). A significant main effect of threat, F(1, 543) = 4.32, p = .038, ηp2 = .008 indicated
that people perceived both critics as having less benevolent intentions in the presence of
threat (M = 3.49, SD = 1.71) compared to its absence (M = 3.80, SD = 1.72) . A main
effect of critic type, F(1, 543) = 117.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .178, indicated that they also
attributed more benevolent motives to the ingroup critic (M = 4.38, SD = 1.60) than
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outgroup critic (M = 2.90, SD = 1.51). An additional main effect of value affirmation,
F(1, 543) = 15.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .028, indicated that people perceived critics to have
more benevolent motives when the value of free speech was affirmed (M = 3.95, SD =
1.64) than when it was not (M = 3.43, SD = 1.74).
These main effects were moderated by significant two-way interaction effects
similar to the ones reported earlier. First, a marginally significant Value x Threat
interaction, F(1, 543) = 3.55, p = .060, ηp2 = .007, showed that when the value of free
speech was not affirmed, people perceived both critics as having less benevolent motives
in the presence of threat (M = 3.19, SD = 1.60) compared to its absence (M = 3.67, SD =
1.85), t(543) = 3.04, p = .003, d = .28. But when the value of free speech was affirmed,
they attributed equally benevolent motives to all critics regardless of threat (Mno threat =
3.97, SD = 1.54; M threat = 3.93, SD = 1.77), t(543) = .13, p = .899, d = .02 (Figure 7 Panel
A).
Second, a Value x Critic Type interaction, F(1, 543) = 11.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .021,
indicated that when free speech was not affirmed, ingroup critics were considered to have
far more benevolent motives (M = 4.34, SD = 1.62) than outgroup critics (M = 2.50, SD =
1.32), t(543) = 10.95, p < .001, d = 1.25, but when free speech was affirmed this
intergroup difference was reduced (Mingroup = 4.43, SD = 1.57; Moutgroup = 3.45, SD =
1.58), t(543) = 4.88, p < .001, d = .62 (Figure 7 Panel B).
Third, replicating Experiments 1-3, an interaction between Threat x Critic Type,
F(1, 543) = 6.83, p = .009, ηp2 = .012, showed that in the absence of threat, people
perceived the ingroup critic as having more benevolent motives (M = 4.70, SD = 1.48)
than an outgroup critic (M = 2.90, SD = 1.45), t(543) = 9.73, p < .001, d = 1.23. But in
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the presence of threat, this ingroup preference was reduced (ingroup M = 4.05, SD = 1.65;
outgroup M = 2.90, SD = 1.58), t(543) = 5.69, p < .001, d = .71. The 3-way interaction
between Value Affirmation x Threat x Critic Type was nonsignificant, F(1, 543) = .17, p
= .683, ηp2 < .001.
In sum, Experiment 4 revealed four primary findings. First, replicating
Experiments 1-3, I found that while in the absence of threat people preferred to hear
criticism from ingroup members than outgroup members, activation of situational threat
led people to become closed to criticism about their group regardless of who the critic
was—an ingroup or outgroup member. Second, new to this experiment, results revealed
that affirming free speech as a fundamental national value increased openness to group
criticism even when the group was under threat, regardless of the identity of the critic.
Third, affirming the value of free speech also overcame preferential treatment of ingroup
over outgroup critics. While people preferred ingroup critics in the absence of value
affirmation, reminding them of the constitutional value of free speech was sufficient to
erase or reduce ingroup preference. Finally, I did not find any evidence suggesting that
value affirmation only benefits ingroup critics, as indicated by the consistent lack of
three-way interactions between Threat, Critic Type, and Value Affirmation for all
dependent variables. This suggests that the benefit of reminding people of the
fundamental value of free speech is not restricted to critics from their group. Rather, it
saves all critics from defensive responses due to threat.
The mediating role of critic’s motives on reactions to criticism
As in the prior experiments I tested whether threat increases suspicions about the
motives of the ingroup critic more than the outgroup critic, and if suspicion, in turn,
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makes them respond negatively to group criticism. I conducted moderated mediation
analyses in which threat vs. no threat served as the predictor, perceived motives of the
critic the mediator, and critic type (ingroup or outgroup) the moderator. Four types of
reactions to criticism were dependent variables. The moderated mediations for all four
dependent variables were significant (see Table 9 for all statistics). Similar to
Experiments 1-2 I again found that in the presence of threat (vs. no threat) participants
were more suspicious of criticism coming from the ingroup member compared to the
outgroup member, B = .67, SE = .26, 95% CI [.150, 1.182]; greater suspicion
significantly predicted less persuasion, B = .66, SE = .03, 95% CI [.599, .727], less
positive attitudes, B = .63, SE = .03, 95% CI [.584, .683], more anger at the critic, B = .77, SE = .04, 95% CI [-.843, -.693], and less willingness to share the critical article, B =
.61, SE = .04, 95% CI [.534, .688]. These mediations were significant for the ingroup
critic, but nonsignificant for the outgroup critic (see Table 9 for all statistics). In other
words, like my prior experiments, threat erased the benefit of doubt usually granted to
ingroup members even when they were critical of their group. But threat has no such
effect on outgroup critics who were regarded with greater suspicion in general.
I also tested whether adding value affirmation would erase the negative effect of
threat on reactions to criticism by decreasing suspicion about the critics’ motives. A
series of moderated mediations in which threat vs. no threat served as the predictor,
critics’ motives the mediator, and value affirmation the moderator, did not reach
significance (see Table 9 for all statistics). However, given my a priori hypotheses, I
separately examined mediational models for the no affirmation condition and the
affirmation condition. Results showed that in the no affirmation condition, all mediations
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were statistically significant. That is, the presence of threat (vs. no threat) significantly
increased suspicion of the critic’s motives, B = -.48, SE = .19, 95% CI [-.864, -.099],
which in turn significantly predicted less persuasion, B = .60, SE = .04, 95% CI [.528,
.680], less positive attitudes toward the critics, B = .57, SE = .03, 95% CI [.513, .633],
more anger at them, B = -.69, SE = .04,

95% CI [-.781, -.606], and less willingness to

share the article on social media, B = .54, SE = .04,95% CI [.456, .632]. However, once
free speech was affirmed as a fundamental American value, all these mediations became
nonsignificant. Now, the presence of threat (vs. no threat) had no effect on suspicion
about the critics’ motives, B = -.03, SE = .22, 95% CI [.877, -.459], or downstream
reactions (see Table 9). These results suggest that reminding people that dissent is an
American value, a patriotic value, makes them less likely to consider criticism against
their nation as evidence of malevolent motives, which in turn makes them more open to
being persuaded by any critic regardless of their group membership.
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CHAPTER 6
POST-HOC POWER ANALYSES
To measure the achieved power for the effects that I found across the studies, I
conducted post-hoc power analyses using the G*Power software program (Erdfelder,
Faul, & Buchner, 1996). I averaged four of the dependent variables (persuasiveness of the
criticism, attitudes toward the critic, emotional reactions toward the critic, and
willingness to share the criticism with others) from each experiment3 into a single
composite of openness to criticism and used the effect size of the interaction to conduct
the post-hoc tests. The post-hoc analyses of achieved power revealed that Experiment 1
had achieved power of .86, Experiment 2 has achieved power of .71, Experiment 3 had
achieved power of .74, and Experiment 5 had achieved power of .79. While three of these
four tests fell below the recommendation of .80 power (Cohen, 1977), these tests suggest
that none of the studies were severely underpowered, as is common on the psychological
literature (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Fraley & Vazire, 2014; Marszalek,
Barber, Kohlhart, & Holmes, 2011). However, these tests come with a few caveats. More
generally, statisticians have long been criticizing the misuse of post-hoc power analyses,
as they are likely to overstate the actual power because they are based on a likely biased
achieved effect size (e.g., Hoenig & Heisey, 2001; but see Gelman & Carlin, 2014). More
specifically to this test of post-hoc power, however, is that the choice to use the effect
size for a single composite of 3-4 dependent variables likely leads to an overstatement of

3

Experiment 1 did not include one of those dependent variables (willingness to share the criticism) and
therefore the composite from Experiment 1 was created using the average of the remaining three dependent
variables.
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the power for the individual dependent variables. Therefore, in addition to calculating the
effect sizes, I also conducted a mini meta-analysis on the results of the four studies.
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CHAPTER 7
MINI META-ANALYSIS
To conduct the mini meta-analysis, I used the instructions and materials from
Goh, Hall, and Rosenthal (2016) to use t-tests from each of the individual studies to
determine effect sizes that could be compared across studies (r), which were then used to
compute a weighted r effect size, which then allowed us to compute Stouffer’s Z, which
in turn enables the computation of a significance test across the four studies. Importantly,
I calculated these effect sizes and tests of meta analytic significance for ingroup critics
(control vs. threat) as well as outgroup critics (control vs. threat).
The meta-analyses for the effects of threat when the critic was an ingroup member
were all significant4 (persuasiveness of the criticism: rweighted = 0.10, z = 4.33, p < .001;
attitudes toward the critic: rweighted = 0.13, z = 5.72, p < .001; negative emotional reactions
rweighted = 0.10, z = 4.34, p < .001; willingness to share the criticism: rweighted = 0.12, z =
5.15, p < .001; perceptions of the critic’s motives: rweighted = 0.12, z = 5.52, p < .001),
indicating that combined across all of the studies, there was a small effect such that
ingroup critics were less persuasive, and were treated more negatively when they
criticized their own group when it was facing threat. Interestingly, the mini meta analysis
also allowed us to test whether the trend across a few studies for outgroup critics to
benefit from threat also emerged. Results indicate that it did (persuasiveness of the
criticism: rweighted = 0.07, z = 2.82, p = .002; attitudes toward the critic: rweighted = 0.05, z =
2.21, p = .014; negative emotional reactions rweighted = 0.07, z = 2.93, p = .002;
willingness to share the criticism: rweighted = 0.05, z = 1.60, p = .045 [not significant using

4

As my hypotheses for the mini meta-analysis were clearly directional, I used a one-tailed test of
significance. I also identify which effects would not be significant using a two-tailed test.
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two-tailed tests]; perceptions of the critic’s motives: rweighted = 0.04, z = 1.76, p = .039
[not significant using two-tailed tests]), such that while outgroup critics were
unpersuasive and unwelcome when the ingroup wasn’t threatened, they became more
persuasive and welcome in the presence of threat.

57

CHAPTER 8
GENERAL DISCUSSION
I started this investigation with a paradox captured by the story of Mehdi Hassan:
while people are typically open to critical feedback about their group when it comes from
sources within their group than from sources outside, sometimes critics from within can
be fiercely rejected. My investigation sought to explain this paradox through a social
psychological lens using national groups as a case in point. I predicted that social
contexts that increase threat to ingroup (American) safety and well-being will produce
defensive reactions to criticism even when it comes from fellow Americans. Second, I
specified and empirically tested the underlying psychological mechanism that drives this
effect. I proposed that in the presence of a threat facing the United States, Americans will
view fellow American critics with heightened suspicion thinking that their criticism aims
to further harm the United States. Under threat, the benefit of positive attributions
typically granted to fellow American critics will become erased and Americans will circle
the wagons around their nation and not tolerate dissent. Because external critics (foreign
nationals) are not expected to be loyal, the introduction of threat does not change
reactions to them. My third goal was to identify a psychological remedy to prevent the
metaphorical circling of wagons and increase openness to criticism. I used value
affirmation. I proposed that reminding American participants of the value of free speech
and dissent in the context of their nation would increase receptivity to criticism.
Across these four experiments, I find support for these hypotheses. In
Experiments 1-4, I showed that while American people are more open to criticism of
their nation from fellow Americans than foreign nationals in the absence of a situational
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threat, they were equally unreceptive to criticism from both Americans and nonAmericans in the presence of threat. This pattern of results emerged when the threat is
relevant to the national economy and economic decline (Experiments 1, 2, and 4)
concerns, and also when the threat is relevant to national security (Experiment 3).
Furthermore, a mini meta-analysis revealed that, across the four studies, not only were
ingroup members punished for criticizing in the presence of situational threat compared
to its absence, but also that outgroup critics benefited from criticizing in the presence of
situational threat.
In support of my second hypothesis, I found that these negative reactions under
threat can be partially explained by increased suspicion about the motives of the
American critic (Experiments 1-4). In the absence of threat to the nation, a fellow
American who was critical about his nation was seen as having far more benevolent
motives for criticizing compared to a critic from another country who levied the same
criticism. However, when Americans felt their nation was under threat (either economic
or national security threat) they became more suspicious of fellow American critics, who
were now seen as disloyal and unpatriotic and became as unpersuasive as non-American
critics.
In support of my third hypothesis, Experiment 4 showed that affirming the core
American value of free speech protected against the negative effects of threat and
prevented biased perceptions of outgroup critics. Reminding Americans of the value of
free speech made them open to criticism even in the presence of threat and eliminated the
typical ingroup preference for criticism from an American, rather than foreign, critic.
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Together, the four experiments reported here provide strong support for my hypotheses
and add to the theoretical understanding of inter- and intragroup relations.
How threat reduces openness to criticism by change attributions of critics’
intentions
My findings extend past research in theoretically important ways. Whereas past
research showed that threat affects people’s attitudes toward ingroup critics (Ariyanto,
Hornsey, & Gallois, 2010; Khoo & See, 2014), I extend it further by showing that threat
also makes critical communications from ingroup members become less persuasive,
increases negative attitudes and anger toward those critics, and increases people’s
reluctance to share the critical communication with others in their social network. I
demonstrate that these ripple effects occur across two very different types of threat
(economic threat and national security threat).
My findings also amplify the importance of threat in shutting down dissent.
Ample extant research shows that groups are open to criticism if that criticism comes
from individuals within the group (see Jetten & Hornsey, 2014 for a review). This
openness is likely because people construe ingroup criticism as a form of constructive
patriotism (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999) coming from critics who are motivated to
help their group improve (Packer, 2009; Packer & Chasteen, 2009; Packer, Fujita, &
Chasteen, 2013). The evidence from this research shows how powerful the experience of
threat can be that it erases the benefit of the doubt typically given to ingroup members.
Future research might investigate whether varying the types of threat will affect people’s
openness to criticism, and if people’s pre-existing beliefs about the threat or the topic of
criticism changes reactions to criticism.
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A key finding from the present research is that the negative effects of threat on
people’s openness to criticism can be explained by changing attributions about the
ingroup critic’s intentions. Under threat, people assume that ingroup critics must have
more malevolent intentions if they are criticizing the group at a time when it is under
threat. Past research has shown that the general preference for criticism coming from
ingroup vs. outgroup critics is due to people’s implicit trust in the benevolent intentions
of fellow ingroup members compared to outgroup members (Hornsey et al., 2007;
Hornsey & Imani, 2004; Hornsey et al., 2002; Hornsey et al., 2004), which aligns with
classic research on the ultimate attribution error, ascribing better intentions to ingroup
rather than outgroup members (Hewstone, 1990; Pettigrew, 1979). However, my research
points to a boundary condition of the ultimate attribution error by demonstrating that
while it applies in the absence of threat, the presence of threat eliminates preferential
attributions about the intentions of ingroup members.
In the three experiments where I found consistent mediational evidence
supporting my hypothesis that threat increased suspicion about the motives of ingroup
(relative to outgroup) critic, which in turn eliminated ingroup preference, the source of
threat was economic insecurity. When I tested the same hypothesis using national
security threat the mediation was nonsignificant but all other results remained the same. I
speculate that this may have occurred because national security threat is an external threat
coming from outside the group whereas economic threat is an internal threat emanating
from within the group. Because national security threat coming from the outside primes
intergroup conflict, it may strengthen group boundaries and present a higher bar for
removing the benefit of the doubt granted to ingroup members only. Alternatively,
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despite psychological theories frequently regarding physical and economic threats
similarly (e.g., Maslow, 1943; Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios Morrison, 2009), they may lead
people to respond to them differently, as physical threats may require more immediate
responses to immediate danger while economic threat pose more of a longer-term threat
to financial stability. Finally, as I noted previously, the criticism manipulations in
Experiment 3 were designed to be more constructive than in previous studies which may
have diluted the effects in Experiment 3. Future research should test these findings across
more types of threat to explore boundary conditions.
Increasing openness to criticism through value affirmation despite threat or critics’
identity
A final goal of this research was to test an intervention that might overcome
people’s inclination to become more suspicious of critic’s intentions when under threat.
To do this, I provided people with a reminder that free speech is a fundamental value of
the United States with the goal of legitimizing criticism. I started with two a priori
predictions. On the one hand, reminders of the value of free speech might erase the
inclination to mistrust criticism under threat regardless of whether it came from a fellow
American or a foreigner. Because value affirmation targets the way that people process
the content of criticism, I reasoned that the beneficial effects of this reminder ought to
apply regardless of the nationality of the critic. However, another plausible a priori
hypothesis was that American participants might only extend the benefits of free speech
to fellow Americans because free speech is specifically an American value. The results of
Experiment 4 supported the former prediction, not the latter. Being reminded of the
fundamental American value of free speech erased defensive reactions to threat and led
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people to become more open to criticism regardless of the critic’s group membership, not
just for critics who were fellow ingroup members.
A second finding from Experiment 4 was that regardless of threat, reminding
people of the value of free speech erased ingroup preference by making people equally
open to criticism from ingroup and outgroup members. This finding complements
Hornsey and colleagues’ finding that openness to outgroup critics increases when the
critic includes praise of the target group along with the criticism, or acknowledges that
their own group is also guilty of the same problem (Hornsey, Robson, Smith, Esposo, &
Sutton, 2008). I demonstrate an alternative way of allowing outgroup critics to be heard
by using the power of value affirmation. This intervention does not place the onus on the
outgroup critic. Instead, it changes the perceiver’s mindset and reframes their
interpretation of criticism, which influences the motivations perceivers attribute to the
critic.
Thus, I have evidence that affirming the value of free speech and dissent can erase
bias in people’s reactions to critiques in two ways. First, reminders of the value of free
speech helps temper the impulse to become more closed to critical communications
delivered under threat. Second, these reminders also help people overcome their instinct
to only trust and listen to people who are members of their own group rather than also
listen to people making the same argument from other groups. In both cases, this happens
because affirming the value of free speech helps overcome biases in attributing malign
motives to all critics when perceivers feel threatened vs. not threatened and to outgroup
critics more than ingroup critics.
Differential Effects of Situational Threat on Ingroup and Outgroup Critics
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The mini meta-analysis conducted on these four experiments revealed two
interesting patterns. First, as predicted, while Americans were open to group criticism
from ingroup members in the absence of threat, the presence of threat made them less
open to criticism. Interestingly, however, the meta-analysis also suggested that while
threat is harmful to ingroup critics, it may actually make people more open to group
criticism from outgroup members. Across the four studies, the meta-analysis showed that
situational threat increased openness to the outgroup critic and his message. While it is
unclear why this happens, it may be that while ingroup critics are expected to “circle the
wagons” and defend the ingroup when it is being threatened, outgroup critics may face no
such expectation. This might lead people to see ingroup critics who criticize when the
group is threatened as betrayers and disloyal (Moreland & McGinn, 1999) while
outgroup members may be rewarded for their interest in group affairs during threatening
situations. Further research is necessary to better understand this counter-intuitive
finding.
Limitations and Future Directions
While these studies show consistent effects confirming a priori predictions, there
are a number of limitations that will require additional study and experimentation. First,
across all four studies, the criticism was delivered in the form of an article purportedly
printed in the International Herald Tribune. This raises the possibility that the effects
reported here are dependent on the audience’s perception that the criticism is being
delivered not solely to an ingroup (American) audience, but to a wider international
audience. Past research has found that people are less open to ingroup criticism when it is
made to an outgroup audience (Elder, Sutton, & Douglas, 2005), and that strongly
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identified ingroup members are less likely to criticize their group in the presence of an
outgroup audience (Packer, 2014). Thus, it may be that the international nature of the
newspaper that the criticism was purportedly published in might be affecting the results.
It is important to note, however, that all participants saw articles published in the
identical source. However, one possible confounding variable may be the way in which
the articles included grammatical changes to indicate the audience, as the ingroup critic
referred to Americans as “we,” suggesting an ingroup (American) audience, whereas the
outgroup critic referred to Americans as “they,” suggesting an outgroup (non-American)
audience, as the correct referent for an American audience would have been “you.” At the
same time, politeness may preclude the use of the more accusatory “you,” which leaves
the question open of who the readers were imagining the audience to be (this potential
confound may also affect other research on group criticism; e.g., Ariyanto et al., 2010;
Hornsey et al., 2002). Thus, it may be that uncertainty over the identity of the audience
may be affecting the results reported here. Further research should ask readers who they
imagine the intended audience to be for the critical articles, and may also test whether the
effects reported here are dependent on the composition of the perceived audience.
Another potential weakness of this research is that the samples reported here are
not truly representative of Americans as a whole, and these effects may also not
generalize beyond Americans to other cultures and societies. The studies reported here
were all conducted through Amazons Mechanical Turk, which granted access to a more
diverse and representative convenience sample than can be accessed through all-student
university samples. However, despite increased diversity, these samples are still drawn
from a self-selected population that likely differs from the general population.
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Furthermore, effects that generalize to the broader U.S. population may not generalize to
other populations and cultural contexts (see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).
Therefore, further research should test whether threat similarly decreases openness to
ingroup criticism in other social and cultural contexts.
Additionally, it is important to note that the criticisms used in the studies reported
here, as well as in previous research on group criticism (e.g., Ariyanto et al., 2010;
Hornsey et al., 2002), included harsh statement about the group in question and are not
explicitly constructive. For example, in Hornsey and colleagues (2002), the target group
(Australians) were referred to as “racist,” “intolerant,” and “[not as] cultured as other
societies.” Similarly, the criticism used by Ariyanto and colleagues (2010) included
references to Muslims as being “fanatical,” “easily provoked,” and “intolerant.” This
raises the question of whether the roles of group membership and threat on openness to
criticism remain the same for a wide range of criticism or are specifically the case for
harsher criticism. This is particularly relevant as Experiment 3, in which I intentionally
sought to make the criticism less harsh and more constructive, revealed somewhat weaker
effects than the Experiments with harsher and less constructive criticism. Therefore,
further research should investigate to what extent the harshness and lack of explicit
constructiveness of the criticism affect people’s reactions.
Finally, in the experiments reported here, attention checks were used to identify
and remove participants who did not pay enough attention to the content of the threat
manipulation article or to the identity of the author of the critical article. However, with
the exception of Experiment 3, these Experiments did not include measures of how
concerned participants were about the economy or national security. Unfortunately, the
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manipulation check in Experiment 3 did not reveal any difference in perceived threat
between those in the threat vs. control conditions5. Further research should include
validated manipulation checks to identify the way in which the threat and critic
nationality manipulations change participants’ perceptions.
Conclusion
As Mehdi Hasan discovered, being a valued member of a group is not always
sufficient to protect one from harsh reactions to criticism of ingroup behavior. People
sometimes respond to perceptions that their group is embattled and under threat by
closing themselves off to all criticism. The dangers of this approach are self-evident, both
to the group itself but also to other groups around them. By showing how publicly
affirming the value of free speech and dissenting opinions can help people overcome the
defensive impulse to circle the wagons and close themselves off to all forms of criticism,
this research proposes a way forward to improve intra- and intergroup dialogue allowing
the free flow of ideas and dissenting opinions essential to good group decision-making.

5

The manipulation check found that, on average, participants were more concerned and had more negative
emotions (fear, anger, anxiety, worry, and calmness) about the state of national security than not, although
there were no significant differences between the threat and control conditions.

67

TABLES
Table 1: Experiment 1 inferential and descriptive statistics
Threat Condition
Dependent
Variable

Persuasion

Attitudes

Emotional
Reactions

Critic's
Motives

Critic
Type

No Threat

Threat

Ingroup

3.84 (1.55)

3.53 (1.62)

Outgroup

2.56 (1.00)

3.15 (1.49)

t(294)=4.13, p<.001

t(294)=1.81, p=.072

Ingroup

3.98 (1.36)

3.49 (1.62)

Outgroup

2.67 (1.17)

2.95 (1.41)

t(294)=4.35, p<.001

t(294)=2.67, p=.008

Ingroup

3.27 (1.84)

3.81 (1.86)

Outgroup

4.86 (1.67

4.00 (1.82)

t(294)=-4.19, p<.001

t(294)=0.74, p=.463

Ingroup

4.11 (1.45)

3.62 (1.49)

Outgroup

1.36 (0.79)

1.51 (0.81)

Main Effects
Main effect of
Main effect of Critic
Threat
Type
t(294)=-1.20,
p=.232
t(294)= 2.23,
p=.027

t(294) =-1.92,
p=.056
t(294)= 1.11,
p=.269

t(294)= 1.71,
p=.089
t(294)=-2.64,
p=.009

t(294)=2.36,
p=.019
t(294)=.69,
p=.489

F(1, 294) = 0.55

F(1, 294) = 19.65

p = .458
Mcontrol 3.22(1.46);
Mthreat 3.34(1.57)

p < .001
Mingroup 3.63(1.60);
Moutgroup 2.98(1.39)

F(1, 294) = 0.31

F(1, 294) = 26.07

p = .575
Mcontrol 3.34(1.42);
Mthreat 3.22(1.54)

p < .001
Mingroup 3.64(1.55);
Moutgroup 2.87(1.35)

F(1, 294) = 0.46

F(1, 294) = 15.17

p = .500
Mcontrol 4.04(1.92);
Mthreat 3.91(1.84)

p < 0.01
Mingroup 3.64(1.87);
Moutgroup 4.26(1.82)

F(1, 294) = 1.35

F(1, 294) = 267.60

Interaction
Effect
Threat x
Critic Type
F(1, 294) =
5.89
p = .016

F(1, 294) =
4.56
p = .034

F(1, 294) =
9.47
p = .002

F(1, 294) =
4.62

p = .246
p < .001
p = .033
Mcontrol 2.77(1.81);
Mingroup 3.78(1.49);
t(294)=11.10, p<.001 t(294)=12.74, p<.001
Mthreat 2.55(1.60)
Moutgroup 1.46(0.81)
Note. The t-tests beneath the No Threat and Threat columns compare the reaction to ingroup vs. outgroup critics within that column. The t-tests to the right
of the ingroup and outgroup rows compare the reaction to ingroup or outgroup critics across Threat and No Threat.
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Table 2: Experiment 1 conditional process analyses
Independent
Variable (X)

Threat vs. No
Threat

Moderating
Variable
(W)

Critic Type:
Ingroup vs.
outgroup

Mediator
(M)

Critic's
Motives

a path

b path

c' path

X*W --> M

M --> Y

X*W --> Y

Persuasion

B = .64, SE =
.30, 95% CI
[.054, 1.229]

B = .53, SE
= .07, 95%
CI [.403,
.663]

B = .55, SE =
.34, 95% CI
[-.107, 1.235]

Positive
Attitudes

B = .64, SE =
.30, 95% CI
[.054, 1.229]

B = .59, SE
= .06, 95%
CI [.473,
.717]

B = .39, SE =
.31, 95% CI
[-.236, 1.020]

Emotional
Reactions

B = .64, SE =
.30, 95% CI
[.054, 1.229]

B = -.46, SE
= .09, 95%
CI [-.627, .292]

B = -1.11, SE
= .44, 95%
CI [-1.972, .244]

Outcome
(Y)

a*b path (indirect effect)
Ingroup
Outgroup
critic
critic
Overall
B = .08,
B = -.26,
B = .34, SE
SE = .08,
SE = .14,
= .16, 95%
95% CI
95% CI [CI [.048,
[-.075,
.542, -.007]
.227]
.227]
B = .20,
B = -.20,
B = .38, SE
SE = .23,
SE = .23,
= .18, 95%
95% CI
95% CI [CI [.036,
[-.246,
.636, .247]
.739]
.641]
B = -.07,
B = .23, SE
B = -.29, SE
SE = .07,
= .12, 95%
= .14, 95%
95% CI
CI [.015,
CI [-.623, [-.196,
.500]
.050]
.068]

Note. The "a" path denotes the effect of the interaction between Threat and Critic Type on the mediator, perceived intentions. The "c'" path denotes the
same interaction on the outcome variable, controlling for the effect of critic's intentions.
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Table 3: Experiment 2 inferential and descriptive statistics
Threat Condition
Dependent
Variable

Persuasion

Attitudes

Emotional
Reactions

Behavioral
Intentions

Critic's
Motives

Critic
Type

No Threat

Threat

Ingroup

3.70 (1.63)

2.97 (1.71)

Outgroup

2.89 (1.55)
t(388)=3.77,
p<.001

2.85 (1.52)
t(388)=.50, p=.616

Ingroup

3.91 (1.34)

3.23 (1.55)

Outgroup

3.04 (1.42)
t(388)=4.66,
p<.001

2.88 (1.23)
t(388)=1.63,
p=.105

Ingroup

3.81 (1.69)

4.65 (1.79)

Outgroup

4.69 (1.75)
t(388)=3.77,
p<.001

4.79 (1.66)
t(388)=-.55,
p=.581

Ingroup

3.45 (1.99)

2.35 (1.89)

Outgroup

2.47 (1.82)
t(388)=3.90,
p<.001

2.52 (1.71)
t(388)=-.57,
p=.567

Ingroup

4.71 (1.40)

3.78 (1.68)

Outgroup

Main Effects

t(388)=3.15,
p=.002
t(388)= .16,
p=.873

t(388)=3.40,
p<.001
t(388)=.77,
p=.442

t(388)= 3.36,
p<.001
t(388)=-.42,
p=.672

t(388)=4.08,
p<.001
t(388)=-.16,
p=.873

t(388)=4.54,
p<.001
t(388)=-.53,
p=.598

Main effect of
Threat

Main effect of
Critic Type

F(1, 388) = 5.53

F(1, 388) = 8.27

p = .019
Mcontrol 3.29(1.64);
Mthreat 2.91(1.61)

p = .004
Mingroup 3.38(1.70);
Moutgroup 2.87(1.53)

F(1, 388) = 8.78

F(1, 388) = 18.59

p = .003
Mcontrol 3.47(1.44);
Mthreat 3.05(1.40)

p < .001
Mingroup 3.61(1.47);
Moutgroup 2.97(1.33)

F(1, 388) = 7.22

F(1, 388) = 8.51

p = .008
Mcontrol 4.25(1.77);
Mthreat 4.72(1.72)

p = .004
Mingroup 4.17(1.77);
Moutgroup 4.73(1.71)

F(1, 388) = 7.80

F(1, 388) = 4.67

p = .006
Mcontrol 2.96(1.97);
Mthreat 2.44(1.79)

p = .314
Mingroup 2.97(2.02);
Moutgroup 2.49(1.77)

F(1, 388) = 8.15

F(1, 388) = 181.97

Interactio
n Effect
Threat x
Critic
Type
F(1, 388) =
4.52
p = .034

F(1, 388) =
3.53
p = .061

F(1, 388) =
4.38
p = .037

F(1, 388) =
9.10
p = .003

F(1, 388) =
12.94

2.26 (1.28)
2.37 (1.25)
p = .005
p < .001
p < .001
t(388)=12.86,
t(388)=6.62,
Mcontrol 3.48(1.81); Mingroup 4.30(1.60);
p<.001
p<.001
Mthreat 3.06(1.64)
Moutgroup 2.31(1.26)
Note. The t-tests beneath the No Threat and Threat columns compare the reaction to ingroup vs. outgroup critics within that column. The t-tests to the
right of the ingroup and outgroup rows compare the reaction to ingroup or outgroup critics across Threat and No Threat.
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Table 4: Experiment 2 conditional process analyses
Independen
t Variable
(X)

Threat vs.
No Threat

Moderatin
g Variable
(W)

Critic Type:
Ingroup vs.
outgroup

Mediato
r (M)

Outcome
(Y)

a path

b path

c' path

X*W --> M

M --> Y
B = .79, SE
= .04, 95%
CI [.703,
.868]
B = .73, SE
= .03, 95%
CI [.663,
.796]
B = -.73, SE
= .05, 95%
CI [-.830, .633]

X*W --> Y
B = -.12, SE
= .24, 95%
CI [-.587,
.358]
B = -.22, SE
= .19, 95%
CI [-.599,
.160]
B = .02, SE
= .29, 95%
CI [-.543,
.582]

a*b path (indirect effect)
Ingroup
Outgroup
critic
critic
Overall
B = -.72, SE B = .08, SE
B = .80, SE
= .18, 95%
= .14, 95%
= .22, 95%
CI [-1.083, CI [-.194,
CI [.352,
.385]
.359]
1.243]
B = -.67, SE B = .08, SE
B = .75, SE
= .17, 95%
= .13, 95%
= .21, 95%
CI [-.993, CI [-.173,
CI [.346,
.341]
.337]
1.163]
B = .68, SE
B = -.07,
B = -.75, SE
= .17, 95%
SE = .13,
= .22, 95%
CI [.345,
95% CI [CI [-1.181, 1.010]
.340, .183]
.324]

B = .76, SE
= .06, 95%
CI [.649,
.866]

B = .36, SE
= .32, 95%
CI [-.258,
.985]

B = -.70, SE
= .18, 95%
CI [-1.048, .356]

Persuasio
n

B = 1.03, SE =
.29, 95% CI
[.466, 1.590]

Positive
Attitudes

B = 1.03, SE =
.29, 95% CI
[.466, 1.590]

Emotional
Reactions

B = 1.03, SE =
.29, 95% CI
[.466, 1.590]

Behaviora
l
Intentions

B = 1.03, SE =
.29, 95% CI
[.466, 1.590]

Critic's
Motives

B = .08, SE
= .14, 95%
CI [-.191,
.349]

B = .79, SE
= .22, 95%
CI [.359,
1.231]

Note. The "a" path denotes the effect of the interaction between Threat and Critic Type on the mediator, perceived intentions. The "c'" path denotes
the same interaction on the outcome variable, controlling for the effect of critic's intentions.
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Table 5: Experiment 3 inferential and descriptive statistics
Threat Condition
Dependent
Variable

Persuasion

Attitudes

Emotional
Reactions

Behavioral
Intentions

Critic's
Motives

Critic
Type

No Threat

Threat

Ingroup

4.14 (1.83)

3.75 (1.68)

Outgroup

3.24 (1.72)
t(666)=4.82,
p<.001

3.68 (1.75)
t(666)=.34,
p=.737

Ingroup

4.46 (1.55)

4.15 (1.39)

Outgroup

3.69 (1.47)
t(666)=4.86,
p<.001

3.95 (1.40)
t(666)=1.11,
p=.269

Ingroup

3.32 (1.80)

3.58 (1.63)

Outgroup

4.31 (1.78)
t(666)=-5.36,
p<.001

3.96 (1.72)
t(666)=-1.83,
p=.067

Ingroup

3.70 (1.98)

3.41 (1.99)

Outgroup

2.93 (1.91)
t(664)=3.72,
p<.001

3.31 (1.90)
t(664)=.46,
p=.649

Ingroup

5.12 (1.56)

4.96 (1.50)

Outgroup

t(666)=2.04,
p=.042
t(666)= -2.33,
p=.020

t(666)=1.94,
p=.052
t(666)=-1.65,
p=.099

t(666)= -1.42,
p=.156
t(666)=1.95,
p=.052

t(664)=1.32,
p=.189
t(664)=-1.86,
p=.063

t(666)=1.03,
p=.302
t(666)=-1.68,
p=.094

Main Effects
Main effect of
Main effect of Critic
Threat
Type

Interaction
Effect
Threat x Critic
Type

F(1, 666) =.02

F(1, 666) = 12.73

F(1, 666) = 9.49

p = .882
Mcontrol 3.68(1.83);
Mthreat 3.71(1.71)

p < .001
Mingroup 3.96(1.77);
Moutgroup 3.45(1.75)

p = .002

F(1, 666) = .06

F(1, 666) = 17.23

F(1, 666) = 6.49

p = .800
Mcontrol 4.06(1.56);
Mthreat 4.04(1.40)

p < .001
Mingroup 4.31(1.48);
Moutgroup 3.81(1.44)

p = .011

F(1, 666) = .11

F(1, 666) = 25.29

F(1, 666) = 5.63

p = .744
Mcontrol 3.83(1.86);
Mthreat 3.79(1.69)

p < .001
Mingroup 3.44(1.73);
Moutgroup 4.14(1.76)

p = .018

F(1, 664) = .12

F(1, 664) = 8.40

F(1, 664) = 5.02

p = .727
Mcontrol 3.30(1.98);
Mthreat 3.35(1.94)

p = .004
Mingroup 3.56(1.98);
Moutgroup 3.11(1.91)

p = .025

F(1, 666) = .18

F(1, 666) = 144.01

F(1, 666) = 3.64

3.46 (1.60)
3.73 (1.53)
p = .674
p < .001
p = .057
t(666)=10.08,
t(666)=6.97,
Mcontrol 4.26(1.78);
Mingroup 5.04(1.53);
p<.001
p<.001
Mthreat 4.30(1.63)
Moutgroup 3.59(1.57)
Note. The t-tests beneath the No Threat and Threat columns compare the reaction to ingroup vs. outgroup critics within that column. The t-tests to
the right of the ingroup and outgroup rows compare the reaction to ingroup or outgroup critics across Threat and No Threat.
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Table 6: Experiment 3 conditional process analyses
Independent
Variable (X)

Moderating
Variable
(W)

Mediator
(M)

Outcome
(Y)

Persuasion

Threat vs. No
Threat

Critic Type:
Ingroup vs.
outgroup

Positive
Attitudes
Critic's
Motives
Emotional
Reactions

Behavioral
Intentions

a path
X*W -->
M
B = .44, SE
= .24, 95%
CI [-.033,
.908]
B = .44, SE
= .24, 95%
CI [-.033,
.908]
B = .44, SE
= .24, 95%
CI [-.033,
.908]
B = .43, SE
= .24, 95%
CI [-.044,
.898]

b path

c' path

M --> Y
B = .82, SE
= .03, 95%
CI [.766,
.883]
B = .72, SE
= .02, 95%
CI [.671,
.763]
B = -.82,
SE = .03,
95% CI [.874, -.757]
B = .75, SE
= .04, 95%
CI [.678,
.830]

X*W --> Y
B = .46, SE
= .19, 95%
CI [.013,
.096]
B = .25, SE
= .15, 95%
CI [-.034,
.542]
B = -.25, SE
= .19, 95%
CI [-.618,
.110]
B = .35, SE
= .24, 95%
CI [-.126,
.818]

a*b path (indirect effect)
Ingroup
Outgroup
critic
critic
Overall
B = -.13, SE
B = .23, SE B = .36, SE
= .14, 95%
= .14, 95%
= .20, 95%
CI [-.405,
CI [-.045,
CI [-.030,
.147]
.497]
.738]
B = -.12, SE
B = .20, SE B = .31, SE
= .12, 95%
= .12, 95%
= .17, 95%
CI [-.353,
CI [-.036,
CI [-.024,
.128]
.442]
.651]
B = .13, SE
B = -.22, SE B = -.36, SE
= .14, 95%
= .14, 95%
= .19, 95%
CI [-.126,
CI [-.494,
CI [-.744,
.409]
.043]
.009]
B = -.12, SE
B = .20, SE B = .32, SE
= .13, 95%
= .13, 95%
= .18, 95%
CI [-.379,
CI [-.049,
CI [-.026,
.133]
.451]
.688]

Note. The "a" path denotes the effect of the interaction between Threat and Critic Type on the mediator, perceived intentions. The "c'" path denotes
the same interaction on the outcome variable, controlling for the effect of critic's intentions.
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Table 7: Experiment 4 descriptive statistics
Threat Condition
Dependent
Variable

Value
Affirmation

Critic Type

No Threat

Threat

Persuasion

Ingroup
Outgroup

Attitudes

Ingroup
Outgroup

3.76 (1.79)
3.04 (1.54)
t(543)=2.93, p=.004
4.11 (1.40)
3.21 (1.27)
t(543)=4.28, p<.001
3.72 (1.83)
4.62 (1.70)
t(543)=-3.14, p=.002
3.32 (1.99)
2.45 (1.48)
t(543)=3.25, p=.001
4.80 (1.54)
2.56 (1.40)
t(543)=9.38, p<.001
3.24 (1.53)
2.92 (1.34)
t(543)=1.14, p=.253
3.63 (1.27)
3.30 (1.09)
t(543)=1.40, p=.1.62
4.13 (1.75)
4.48 (1.75)
t(543)=-1.06, p=.289
2.69 (1.69)
2.58 (1.55)
t(543)=.37, p=.708
4.58 (1.42)
3.33 (1.40)
t(543)=4.67, p<.001

3.08 (1.43)
2.90 (1.44)
t(543)=.73, p=.468
3.23 (1.32)
3.05 (1.31)
t(543)=.87, p=.385
4.36 (1.72)
4.56 (1.91)
t(543)=-.70, p=.485
2.45 (1.47)
2.19 (1.55)
t(543)=.97, p=.335
3.90 (1.59)
2.44 (1.25)
t(543)=6.10, p<.001
3.13 (1.61)
3.43 (1.66)
t(543)=-1.00, p=.316
3.35 (1.39)
3.65 (1.51)
t(543)=-.1.21, p=.227
4.57 (1.82)
4.17 (2.08)
t(543)=1.14, p=.257
2.30 (1.63)
3.10 (2.07)
t(543)=-2.48, p=.014
4.27 (1.73)
3.59 (1.76)
t(543)=2.33, p=.020

Emotional
Reactions

No Affirmation

Ingroup
Outgroup
Ingroup
Outgroup

Behavioral
Intentions
Critic's Motives

Ingroup
Outgroup

Persuasion

Ingroup
Outgroup

Attitudes

Ingroup
Outgroup

Emotional
Reactions
Behavioral
Intentions
Critic's Motives

Value Affirmation

Ingroup
Outgroup
Ingroup
Outgroup
Ingroup
Outgroup

t(543)=2.78, p=.006
t(543)= .57, p=.570
t(543)=4.20, p< .001
t(543)=.78, p=.436
t(543)= -2.22, p=.027
t(543)=-.23, p=.820
t(543)=3.25, p=.001
t(543)=.95, p=.341
t(543)=3.80, p=.001
t(543)=.51, p=.611
t(543)=.37, p=.709
t(543)= -1.75, p=.080
t(543)=1.16, p=.245
t(543)=1.43, p=.153
t(543)= -.1.30, p=.195
t(543)=.90, p=.366
t(543)=.1.28, p=.202
t(543)=-1.66, p=.098
t(543)=1.13, p=.260
t(543)=-.93, p=.354

Note. The t-tests beneath the No Threat and Threat columns compare the reaction to ingroup vs. outgroup critics within that column. The ttests to the right of the rows compare the reaction to ingroup or outgroup critics across Threat and No Threat.
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Table 8: Experiment 4 inferential statistics
Main Effects
Dependent
Variable

Main effect
of Value
Affirmation

Main effect
of Threat

Persuasion

p = .904

F(1, 543)
=.62
p = .430

Attitudes

F(1, 543) =
.52
p = .470

F(1, 543) =
4.55
p = .033

Emotional
Reactions

F(1, 543) =
.02
p = .880

F(1, 543) =
1.24
p = .266

Behavioral
Intentions

F(1, 543) =
.20
p = .657

F(1, 543) =
2.94
p = .087

Critic's
Motives

F(1, 543) =
15.80
p < .001

F(1, 543) =
4.32
p = .038

F(1, 543) =.01

Interaction Effects
Main effect of
Critic Type

Threat x Critic
Type

Value
Affirmation x
Threat

Value
Affirmation x
Critic Type

Value
Affirmation x
Threat x
Critic Type

F(1, 543) = 2.94

F(1, 543) = 4.68

F(1, 543) = 5.26

F(1, 543) = 2.74

F(1, 543) = .02

p = .087

p = .031

p = .022

p = .098

p = .895

F(1, 543) = 5.84

F(1, 543) = 8.79

F(1, 543) = 6.00

F(1, 543) = 5.41

F(1, 543) = .03

p = .016

p = .003

p = .015

p = .020

p = .860

F(1, 543) = 2.83

F(1, 543) = 5.31

F(1, 543) = .51

F(1, 543) = 3.45

F(1, 543) = .00

p = .093

p = .022

p = .475

p = .064

p = .957

F(1, 543) = .57

F(1, 543) = 6.91

F(1, 543) = 4.65

F(1, 543) = 9.82

F(1, 543) = .27

p = .451

p = .009

p = .032

p = .002

p = .603

F(1, 543) = 117.55

F(1, 543) = 6.83

F(1, 543) = 3.55

p < .001

p = .009

p = .060
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F(1, 543) =
11.79
p < .001

F(1, 543) = .17
p = .683

Table 9: Experiment 4 conditional process analyses
a path

a*b path (indirect effect)
Ingroup
Outgroup
X*W --> M
M --> Y
X*W --> Y
critic
critic
Overall
B = .67, SE
B = .66, SE
B = .11, SE
B = -.43, SE B = .01, SE B = .44, SE
= .26, 95%
= .03, 95%
= .20, 95%
= .12, 95%
= .12, 95%
= .17, 95%
Persuasion
CI [.150,
CI [.599,
CI [-.286,
CI [-.685, CI [-.229,
CI [.110,
1.182]
.727]
.503]
.189]
.243]
.792]
B = .67, SE
B = .63, SE
B = .24, SE
B = -.41, SE B = .01, SE B = .42, SE
= .26, 95%
= .03, 95%
= .16, 95%
= .12, 95% CI = .17, 95%
= .11, 95%
Positive
CI [.150,
CI [.584,
CI [-.068,
[-.657, -.187]
CI [-.215,
CI [-.096,
Attitudes
Critic Type:
1.182]
.683]
.542]
.254]
.761]
Threat vs. No
Critic's
Ingroup vs.
Threat
Intentions
B = -.67, SE B = -.77, SE B = -.18, SE B = .50, SE =
B = -.01,
B = -.51, SE
outgroup
= .26, 95%
= .04, 95%
= .24, 95%
.14, 95% CI
SE = .14,
= .20, 95%
Emotional
CI [.150,
CI [-.843, CI [-.646,
[.225, .789]
95% CI [CI [-.913, Reactions
1.182]
.693]
.281]
.292, .273]
.114]
B = .67, SE
B = .61, SE
B = .29, SE
B = -.40, SE B = .01, SE B = .41, SE
= .26, 95%
= .04, 95%
= .24, 95%
= .12, 95%
= .11, 95%
= .17, 95%
Behavioral
CI [.150,
CI [.534,
CI [-.182,
CI [-.638, CI [-.212,
CI [.097,
Intentions
1.182]
.688]
.768]
.172]
.229]
.756]
Unaffirmed
Affirmed
Overall
B = .45, SE
B = .58, SE
B = .34, SE
B = -.28, SE
B = -.02,
B = .26, SE
= .29, 95%
= .03, 95%
= .21, 95%
= .11, 95%
SE = .13,
= .17, 95%
Persuasion
CI [-.127,
CI [.525,
CI [-.071,
CI [-.513, 95% CI [CI [-.082,
1.023]
.644]
.745]
.065]
.270, .234]
.592]
B = .45, SE
B = .57, SE
B = .29, SE
B = -.27, SE
B = -.02,
B = .25, SE
= .29, 95%
= .02, 95%
= .16, 95%
= .11, 95% CI
SE = .12,
= .17, 95%
Positive
CI [-.127,
CI [.519,
CI [-.029,
[-.495, -.059]
95% CI [CI [-.080,
Attitudes
Value
1.023]
.612]
.611]
.276, .212]
.580]
Threat vs. No
Affirmation:
Critic's
Threat
Unaffirmed vs. Intentions
B = .45, SE B = -.68, SE B = .10, SE B = .33, SE = B = .02, SE B = -.31, SE
affirmed
= .29, 95%
= .04, 95%
= .24, 95%
.13, 95% CI = .15, 95%
= .20, 95%
Emotional
CI [-.127,
CI [-.754, CI [-.382,
[.078, .603]
CI [-.272,
CI [-.702,
Reactions
1.023]
.614]
.579]
.305]
.093]
B = .45, SE
B = .53, SE
B = .37, SE
B = -.26, SE
B = -.02,
B = .24, SE
= .29, 95%
= .04, 95%
= .25, 95%
= .10, 95%
SE = .12,
= .15, 95%
Behavioral
CI [-.127,
CI [.459,
CI [-.121,
CI [-.465, 95% CI [CI [-.063,
Intentions
1.023]
.602]
.859]
.065]
.252, .201]
.543]
Note. The "a" path denotes the effect of the interaction between Threat and Critic Type on the mediator, perceived intentions. The "c'" path denotes the same
interaction on the outcome variable, controlling for the effect of critic's intentions.
Independent
Variable (X)

Moderating
Variable (W)

Mediator
(M)

Outcome
(Y)
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b path

c' path

FIGURES

Figure 1. Experiment 1 interactions on the primary outcome variables. Paneled by
dependent variable. Threat reduces or eliminates ingroup preference in relation to
persuasion (Panel A), attitudes (Panel B), negative emotions (Panel C), and perceptions
of the critic’s motives (Panel D).

77

Figure 2. Graph of the proposed moderated mediation. Threat (X) reduces the perceived
benevolent motives of the critic (M) for ingroup rather than outgroup critics (W).
Reductions in perceived benevolence, in turn, predict less persuasion and positive
attitudes (Y).
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Figure 3. Experiment 2 interactions on the primary outcome variables. Paneled by
dependent variable. Threat reduces or eliminates ingroup preference in relation to
persuasion (Panel A), attitudes (Panel B), negative emotions (Panel C), behavioral
intentions (Panel D), and perceptions of the critic’s motives (Panel E).
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Figure 4. Experiment 3 interactions on the primary outcome variables. Paneled by
dependent variable. Threat reduces or eliminates ingroup preference in relation to
persuasion (Panel A), attitudes (Panel B), negative emotions (Panel C), behavioral
intentions (Panel D), and perceptions of the critic’s motives (Panel E).
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Figure 5. Experiment 4 interactions on persuasion and attitudes. Value affirmation
eliminates the negative effect of threat on persuasion (Panel A), and also eliminates
ingroup advantage in relation to persuasion (Panel B). Similarly, value affirmation
eliminates the negative effect of threat on attitudes (Panel C) and eliminates the attitude
preference for an ingroup critic (Panel D).
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Figure 6. Experiment 4 interactions on emotions and behavioral intentions. Value
affirmation eliminates the effect of threat on negative emotions (Panel A), and eliminates
ingroup preference in relation to negative emotions (Panel B). Similarly, value
affirmation eliminates the negative effect of threat on behavioral intentions to share the
criticism (Panel C) and eliminates the behavioral intention to share the criticism from
ingroup compared to outgroup critics (Panel D).
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Figure 7. Experiment 4 interactions on the critic’s motives. Value affirmation eliminates
the negative effect of threat on perceptions of the critic’s motives (Panel A), and reduces
the preferential attribution of benevolent motives to ingroup critics (Panel B).
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APPENDIX 1
EXPERIMENT 1 MANIPULATIONS

Threat manipulation article emphasizing international competition.
84

Threat manipulation article without emphasis on international competition.

85

Critical article by an ingroup member (American).

86

Critical article by an outgroup member (South Korean).
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APPENDIX 2
EXPERIMENT 1 DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Persuasiveness of the criticism
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

How much do you agree or disagree with the opinion article you just read?
How persuaded or not persuaded are you by the opinion article you just read?
How important is it to think about the issues raised by this opinion article?
How fair is this opinion article?
How constructive is the opinion article you just read?

Attitudes toward the critic
1) How trustworthy or untrustworthy is the person who wrote this opinion article?
2) How much do you think you would like or dislike the person who wrote this
opinion article?
Emotional reactions
1) How angry or not angry do you feel at the person who wrote this opinion article?
2) How upset or not upset do you feel at the person who wrote this opinion article?
Perceived intentions of the critic
1) How much of a patriotic American is the person who wrote the opinion article
above?
2) How loyal to America is the person who wrote the opinion article above?
3) Would the person who wrote the opinion article above defend America if it was
being unfairly criticized?
Demographics
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

Please indicate your gender:
Please indicate your age:
Please indicate your Race or Ethnicity:
Politically, I see myself as being... ([1]Very Liberal – [7] Very Conservative)
What is your citizenship status?
What is your current employment status?
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APPENDIX 3
EXPERIMENT 2 MANIPULATIONS

Threat article from Experiment 2.
89

Critical article by an outgroup member (South Korean) for Experiment 2.

90

Critical article by an ingroup member (American) for Experiment 2.
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APPENDIX 4
EXPERIMENT 2 DEPENDENT VARIABLES, MEDIATORS, AND
MANIPULATION CHECKS
Threat manipulation check
1) According to this article, how much has average monthly income dropped since
2008 adjusted for inflation?
a. $200
b. $500
c. $1000
d. Average monthly income did not drop
2) Do you think that the article does a poor job or a good job of explaining the
economic situation in the U.S. today?
3) Do you find this article to be convincing or unconvincing?
4) Do you dislike or like this article?
5) Do you share the author’s concern about the state of the U.S. economy?
Open-ended questions about the critical article
1) What type of article did you just read (e.g. news, analysis, opinion, etc.)?
2) If you had to choose one word to describe your reaction to the article, what word
would that be?
3) In a few words, what do you remember about the author?
Persuasiveness of the criticism
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

How much do you agree or disagree with the opinion article you just read?
How persuaded or not persuaded are you by the opinion article you just read?
How important is it to think about the issues raised by this opinion article?
How fair is this opinion article?
How constructive is the opinion article you just read?
How helpful is the opinion article you just read?

Attitudes toward the critic
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

How trustworthy or untrustworthy is the person who wrote this opinion article?
How much do you like or dislike the person who wrote this opinion article?
How intelligent or unintelligent is the author of this opinion article?
How much do you respect or not respect the author of this opinion article?
How kind or unkind is the author of this opinion article?
How competent or incompetent is the author of this opinion article?

Emotional reactions
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1) As an American, how angry or not angry do you feel at the author of this opinion
article?
2) As an American, how upset or not upset do you feel at the author of this opinion
article?
3) As an American, how irritated do you feel by the author of this opinion article?
4) As an American, how insulted do you feel by the author of this opinion article?
5) As an American, how positively do you feel toward the author of this opinion
article?
Behavioral intentions
1) Would you be willing to read more articles by this author?
2) Would you be willing to share this article on social media?
3) Would you be willing to suggest this article to people you know?
Perceived intentions of the critic
1) In your opinion, does the author of this article want to make the U.S. a better
country?
2) In your opinion, does the author of this article care about the United States?
3) In your opinion, does the author of this article care about Americans?
4) In your opinion, does the author of this article feel good when the U.S. succeeds?
5) In your opinion, does the author of this article want to see the U.S. fail?
6) In your opinion, does the author of this article enjoy insulting Americans?
Demographics
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)

Please indicate your gender:
Please indicate your age:
Please indicate your Race or Ethnicity:
Politically, I see myself as being... ([1]Very Liberal – [7] Very Conservative)
What is your citizenship status?
What is your current employment status?
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APPENDIX 5
EXPERIMENT 3 MANIPULATIONS

National security threat article.

94

Critical article allegedly written by an ingroup (American) author.
95

Critical article allegedly written by an outgroup (South Korean) author.
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Attention check items for the threat article.
1)

2)
3)
4)
5)

According to this article, what is one of the main reasons why lone wolf
attacks are not likely to end soon?
a. More people hate America today than ever before.
b. It's easier for people to get weapons.
c. The FBI and US police do not have the tools to stop them.
d. This article was not about that.
Do you think that the article does a poor job or a good job of explaining how
safe or unsafe the U.S. is today? (“Very Poor Job” [1] – “Very Good Job” [7])
Do you find this article to be convincing or unconvincing? (“Not at all
Convincing” [1] –“Very Convincing” [7])
Do you dislike or like this article? (“Completely Dislike” [1] – “Completely
Like” [7])
Are you concerned about the state of U.S. national security? (“Not at all
Concerned” [1] – “Very Concerned” [7])

Manipulation check for critic’s nationality.
1) Earlier you read an opinion article from the International Herald Tribune. Where
was the author of the opinion article from?
a. United States
b. France
c. South Korea
d. The article didn't say
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APPENDIX 6
EXPERIMENT 4 UNIQUE MANIPULATIONS

98

Critical article allegedly written by an ingroup (American) author.

99

Critical article allegedly written by an outgroup (South Korean) author.
Attention check for the value affirmation manipulation.
1) The editorial board added a note to the opinion article. Which of the following did
their note include?
a. "The opinions in this article do not reflect this newspaper's position."
b. "We are only able to provide our content to our loyal readers thanks to the
generosity of readers like yourselves. Please consider contributing."
c. "We strongly believe that the American value of free speech is an
important part of what makes the United States great because it
encourages debate around a diversity of opinions."
d. "We welcome articles and opinions from all people. All articles that are
sent to us will be evaluated for public consumption and will be considered
for publication."
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